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This study on ￿Economic and Monetary Union and Enlargement￿ was commissioned by the 
Directorate-General for Research of the European Parliament from the Netherlands Economic 
Institute (NEI) in May 1999. It reviews the main policy issues concerning the accession of  
ten Central and Eastern European Countries, and Cyprus and Malta, and the interaction with 
their parallel integration into Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
Six key issues will be discussed: 
•  What is the likely phasing and timing of accession into the EU and into the Euro area? 
•  What are the prospects of the applicant countries meeting the Maastricht criteria for Euro 
area membership? 
•  What impact will present and future economic and fiscal policy co-ordination within the 
EU have on the enlargement process? 
•  What are the present exchange rate linkages to the Euro area and how will these evolve as 
first EU membership and then full integration into EMU approach? 
•  What will be the economic and institutional consequences for the accession countries and 
the EU itself if countries decide against or for early entry into the Euro area? 
•  What will be the impact of an expanding Euro area on the international monetary system 
and on neighbouring country groups remaining outside the EU? 
 
This study provides, on the one hand, a briefing on facts, opinions and most likely outcomes. 
We present the views and analysis of the European Commission, of the accession countries 
and of independent commentators in the academic world. However, on certain issues our own 
analysis and judgement complements the variety of views presented. 
 
It also provides a review of academic literature, policy documents of the EU and the 
accession countries and on newsmedia articles. Background information has been gathered 
through discussions with ECB and EC staff, for whose co-operation we express our gratitude. 
The Project Team was given academic guidance by Prof. Peter Bofinger of W￿rzburg 
University and Prof. Hans van Miltenburg of Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
 
 
Summary and Main Conclusions 
 
Phasing and Time-frame 
 
•  The time-frame for EU accession as seen by the accession countries (2002-2003 for the 
￿first wave￿) seems to be more optimistic than that foreseen by most independent 
commentators. The European Commission remains rather vague as to when the first 
applicant countries will be ready for EU membership (￿medium term￿, ￿within the EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
  PE 168.282  viii
lifetime of this Commission￿), although budgetary arrangements have been made. The 
accession of ￿second wave￿ countries lies beyond 2004 (for some more than a decade 
away). 
 
•  The actual implementation of the Acquis, more than its adoption into domestic 
legislation, will form the real challenge for many of the accession countries. A number of 
stumbling blocs are still present for certain countries in areas of the Acquis pertinent to 
EMU: full capital account liberalisation, full independence of the Central Bank, no access 
to privileged finance. The Capital Movement and EMU chapters in the negotiation 
process are expected, however, to be all relatively easily resolved, given the eagerness of 
accession countries not only to joint the EU, but also to prepare for joining the Euro area.  
 
•  The present distinction between ￿first wave￿ and ￿second wave￿ countries will become 
obsolete as countries vary in successfully meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the criteria for 
EU Membership. The next IGC in Helsinki will most probably confirm the Commission￿s 
proposal to start substantive negotiations with all accession countries. Latvia, in 
particular, is expected to the catch up with the first wave, while the Czech Republic and 
Poland seem to be losing some of their initial momentum.  
 
•  The main stumbling blocks to early accession to the EU will be, according to most 
independent commentators, the unfinished transition process in most accession countries 
and the large discrepancies in income and productivity levels. The latter might induce 
large migratory flows or the need for vastly expanded regional subsidy flows. On the EU 
side the reform of the CAP is the most complex and financially important issue to be 
resolved before accession can take place. The internal decision-making structure of 
Commission and Council also needs to be addressed. 
 
•  Both the European Commission and most of the accession countries seem convinced that 
the entry into the Euro area currency union will be a phased process, including a period of 
(at least) two years as EU member but still outside the Euro area. The initial enthusiasm 
of the accession countries for very early adoption of the Euro (at entry to the EU, or even 
earlier) seems to be waning under the influence of advice to the contrary from 
international institutions and the academic world. 
 
•  For the ￿first wave￿ countries the desired time-frame for membership of the Euro area is 
still somewhat optimistic. Although exchange rate linkages to the area can stabilise 
inflationary expectations and improve trade and investment flows, most economists 
suggest that the ongoing transition and productivity catch up in these countries will make 
the Maastricht criteria a too restrictive set of conditions for the accession countries. 
 
•  The exact monetary policy regime for the accession countries once they enter the EU, but 
are not yet in the Euro area still remains somewhat unclear. This phase will, on the basis 
of the Maastricht Treaty, and barring any political override, include in any case a 
minimum period of two years in the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 (ERM2). 
Most accession countries seem to prefer immediate entry into ERM2 at accession into the 
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Prospects of meeting the Maastricht criteria 
 
•  The accession countries are actually performing quite well on several of the Maastricht 
criteria: inflation, fiscal parameters, in some cases also with respect to exchange rate 
stability.Interest rates are, however, still high for most of them, reflecting high real 
interest rates, not yet subdued inflationary expectations and immature capital markets. 
Moreover, long-term interest rates, and corresponding financial instruments of ten-year 
maturity, for the most part do not exist yet in the accession countries, which makes 
applying the interest rate criterion in the Maastricht Treaty problematic. 
 
•  The ￿first wave￿ accession countries, and some others like Latvia and Lithuania, are 
probably right in their opinion that they can attain the Maastricht criteria if they really set 
their minds to it. The EC has not expressed a view on their ability in this respect. 
Convergence towards ￿Maastricht￿ seems more a question of desirability rather than of 
ability. 
 
•  Furthermore, the good performance in convergence in the last two years also has to do 
with the recession experienced by many of the accession countries in the wake of the 
Russian financial crisis. 
 
•  The present convergence is also, to some extent, a sign that transition countries are still in 
the stabilisation phase of economic transition. Countries, like Hungary and Poland, which 
have progressed furthest in market reform and are best able to meet the economic criteria 
for entering the EU (a functioning market economy, able to withstand competitive 
pressures), actually perform worst on the Maastricht criteria. 
 
•  In our opinion, in the coming five years transition (and, if not yet attained, stabilisation) 
issues should still be the main focus of economic policy in the CEE accession countries, 
not convergence to ￿Maastricht￿. A certain threshold of real convergence should have 
been passed before nominal convergence is attempted. This has to do with structural 
pressures on the inflation rate and the real exchange rate in transition economies induced 
by a number of transition and productivity catch-up induced phenomena.  
 
 
The implications of EU economic and fiscal policy co-ordination 
 
•  Once accession countries enter the EU they have they same status with regard to EMU as 
countries like Greece and Sweden (￿countries with a derogation￿). This means that EU 
economic and fiscal policy mechanisms like the broad economic policy guidelines, the 
convergence programmes and the excessive deficit procedure will be applicable to the 
accession countries (but not in such a strict way as for the Euro area members).  
 
•  Understandably, the focus of these mechanisms is on convergence to Euro area 
membership. This underlines the importance of having completed real convergence to a 
certain extent, certainly in the institutional and market-reform sphere, before entry into 
the EU.  
 
•  If, for political reasons, early entry into the EU, and thus continued transition of the 
accession countries within the EU, is deemed necessary, the focus of the EU policy co-EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
  PE 168.282  x
ordination framework should perhaps be changed to more structural issues for these 
countries. 
 
•  Already in the pre-accession policy co-ordination framework of the Joint Assessments the 
influence of the Maastricht Criteria is prematurely felt, despite repeated statements of the 
European Commission that these criteria are not conditions for entry into the EU. 
 
 
Exchange rate linkages with the Euro area  
 
•  The present exchange rate linkages of the accession countries with the Euro area vary 
enormously: from no link, (currency board) peg to the Euro, basket peg (with the Euro in 
the basket), crawling basket peg, to managed float (with shadowing of the Euro). The 
primary aim of all exchange rate linkages is still stabilisation of the economy, although 
the more advanced transition economies see the exchange rate also as an important 
instrument for preserving competitiveness. 
 
•  Only a few of the accession countries have a clear Euro area entry strategy. Poland has 
worked out an interesting strategy in which the currency is progressively loosened ￿ 
previously a basket peg, now a crawling peg, in the coming years a free float ￿ before it 
enters the ERM2 framework. ERM2 is a full Euro peg with intervention facilities, but still 
the possibility of realignment. After two years in ERM2 Poland would then, while also 
meeting the other Maastricht criteria, enter the Euro area. The benefits of the Polish 
example, although quite ambitious in its timing, are that the exchange rate would have 
ample opportunity to find its equilibrium value before entering the Euro area. 
 
•  The alternative to the Polish strategy is not having an intermediate free float period. The 
currency peg used in stabilisation could be repeatedly realigned by the monetary 
authorities and then gradually tightened as equilibrium is approached. ERM2 could then 
be entered once realignments become very infrequent. These strategies thus differ in the 
mechanism used for finding the equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
•  It would seem a good idea that accession countries develop with the European 
Commission and the ECB medium- to long-term EMU entry strategies (and exit strategies 
from their present arrangements), which are attuned to the individual needs and 
possibilities of the accession country in question. 
 
 
Economic and institutional consequences of EMU membership and its timing 
 
•  The dangers of early entry into the Euro area lie in inadequate ￿real convergence￿ on the 
part of accession countries. Inadequate ￿real convergence￿ would mean that structural 
inflationary pressures and the need for reform investments in the accession countries 
would be hampered by too tight monetary and fiscal policies, which might lead to slower 
economic growth. Inadequate diversification of production structure and insufficient 
export orientation towards the EU could make accession countries susceptible to different 
exogenous shocks from the EU.  
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•  The effect of inadequate real convergence could be counteracted by wage flexibility in 
the accession countries, migration to the EU core countries and large fiscal transfers from 
the EU to the new Member States. All these ￿solutions￿ seem only partially feasible both 
from an economic and from a political point of view. 
 
•  For the stability of the Euro and the credibility of ECB monetary policy real convergence 
is also important. Completion of the price liberalisation process and restructuring and 
recapitalisation of the banking system seem important conditions from the Euro area point 
of view, next to sustainable convergence to the Maastricht criteria. 
 
 
The external impact of an expanding Euro area 
 
•  The Euro has, despite a shaky start, very good prospects of becoming one of the world￿s 
leading international currencies. This role will create substantial benefits for the Euro area 
Member States. If the entry of the accession countries into the Euro area goes well the 
future role of the Euro may be enhanced. If it goes badly (because, for example, new 
members cannot adhere to the Maastricht criteria or to the conditions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact), then this could seriously damage the prospects of the Euro becoming an 
international currency. 
 
•  The enlargement of the EU and consequently of the Euro area will initially cause trade 
and capital flow diversion (to the new members) and, somewhat later, the creation of new 
trade and capital flows (for all countries). For country groups with an orientation towards 
the EU (non-accession CEEC￿s, CFA franc countries, the Mediterranean Countries) the 
initial impact of accession could thus be detrimental. Especially with respect to Russia 
and the Ukraine, this could be a cause for concern.  
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1.  Phasing and time-frame 
In this chapter we will give an overview of the phasing and time-frame of the accession 
process, and of the likely full integration into EMU
1,  of the 10 Central and Eastern 
European Countries who have formally applied to become members of the EU, and of Cyprus 
and Malta. 
 
The outcomes of both processes are as yet uncertain and depend amongst other things on the 
successful adoption of the EU membership obligations by the accession countries and the 
reform of certain key-EU policies and decision-making structures by the present EU member 
states. We present the views of the European Commission, of the accession countries, and of 
independent commentators from the academic world. We will also go into the rationale 
behind the various views and discuss the main factors that might speed up or delay both 
processes. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In paragraph 1.1 we discuss accession to the EU 
process; and in paragraph 1.2 entry into the Euro area. 
 
 
1.1  The accession process 
1.1.1 Procedures 
 
The European Commission officially launched accession processes
2 on March 31, 1998 with the 
countries of Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
3, through the mechanisms of the Accession Partnerships
4 
(APs). According to the terms of a European Council decision, the first phase of the accession 
process, the so-called pre-accession phase and its related questions will be dealt via the APs and 
the respective National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), their counterparts 
at the accession-country level. 
 
Substantive negotiations on accession were opened on November 10, 1998, with Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, the so-called ￿first wave￿ countries, 
plus Malta. This set of countries was selected on the basis of their level of fulfilment of 
economic and political criteria set out by the European Council held in Copenhagen in July 1993 
as benchmarks for future member countries. 
 
These criteria, known as the ￿Copenhagen Criteria￿, spelled out that the new entrants should: 
                                                 
1  We use the phrase ￿full integration into EMU￿ as meaning membership of the Euro area currency union. 
 
2    Based on the provision of Article O of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). 
 
3      Malta was only added to this list in October of 1998, when the Council accepted Malta￿s request to 
reactivate its candidature, which had been presented in 1990 but withdrawn following the change in 
government in the island after the general elections of 1996. A new government, elected in September of 
1998, reversed this position. 
 
4   See European Commission, 1998 (b). EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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i)  achieve stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of the law, human 
rights and the respect for and protection of minorities; 
ii)  can be regarded as functioning market economies able to cope with the competitive 
pressures and market forces within the Union; and 
iii)  should be able to take on the obligations of membership (the so-called ￿Acquis 
Communautaire￿
5), including the adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.  
 
The ￿second wave￿ entrants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) have not 
started substantive negotiations yet with the European Commission. In practice this group of 





The division into first and second wave countries will, in practical terms, most probably end 
by a series of new Commission recommendations, published on 13 October, 1999 (see 
European Commission, 1999(a)). In a wide-ranging modification of the EU accession 
procedures and foreign policy ￿yet to be approved by a European Council meeting, to be held 
in Finland, on 12-13 December 1999, substantial negotiations for accession are now to be 
opened with all applicant countries in the year 2000.
6 Negotiation chapters already closed 
with the ￿former￿ first wave countries are to be re-opened. 
                                                 
 
5   The Acquis is expected to be taken in full by all future new entrants, including EMU participation and, in due 




  Turkey was also added to the Application Countries list, but without any date for the opening of 
negotiations. The Balkans was also added to the list of countries for eventual future integration. A new 
framework of co-operation is also to be developed with all remaining EU-neighbouring areas, from Eastern 
 
Box 1: Consequences of Enlargement 
 
The 6 ￿first wave￿ entrants, plus Malta, would add, if they entered the union at the
present time, over 63 million inhabitants to the current Union￿s population (almost two
thirds of them in Poland alone) and over 240 Billion Euro to its GDP (again, over half
of this figure in Poland). This will mean, respectively, a 17% increase in the Union 
population, but a mere 3% increase in its GDP. 
 
In number of countries, this will be the biggest wave of expansion of the Union since
its birth in 1957, surpassing the North Sea Accession of 1973/74 (the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom), the Mediterranean 
Accession of 1982 (the Greek Republic), the Iberian Accession of 1986 (The Kingdom
of Spain and the Portuguese Republic) and the Nordic-Central European Accession of 
1995 (the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden). 
The ￿second wave￿ entrants would add to these figures roughly another 57 million of
people and 97 Billion of Euros (or a 15% increase in the population of the Union, 
but an even more marginal increase of 1.2% in its GDP). This, of course, reflects 
the lower level of development of the two biggest countries in this group, Bulgaria and
Romania. 
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Both groups of countries have in the past two years been monitored by the European 
Commission on their progress in adopting and implementing the obligations under the Acquis 
via so-called ￿screening￿ operations.
7 At the request of the European Council the European 
Commission reports on these ￿screening￿ operations in yearly ￿Regular Reports on Progress 
Towards Accession￿ on each of the candidate countries.
8 The progress of all twelve countries 
involved in the accession process is summarised in a yearly ￿Composite Paper￿.  
 
The most recent Composite Paper was published in October of this year. It suggested that some 
￿first wave countries￿, especially Poland and the Czech Republic, were falling behind in their 
progress in implementing EU-legislation. On the other hand, a number of ￿second wave 
countries￿ have taken great strides in conforming to the Copenhagen criteria. The probable 
opening of substantive negotiations with all accession countries should be seen in that light, and, 
in that of the widely felt new sense of urgency for not letting ￿the window of opportunity￿ for 





Table 1.1 summarises the views of the European Commission (EC), the accession countries and 
independent commentators on the likely timing of accession. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Europe (mostly the Russian Federation and the CIS ￿Commonwealth of Independent States) to the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
 
7   In practical negotiation terms, while ￿first wave￿ countries were dealt with by the ￿Enlargement Task 
Force￿, the ￿second wave￿ countries had their screening handled by the DG1A. In the new Prodi 
Commission both groups of countries will be handled by the new Directorate-General for Enlargement  
 
8
   The most recent ones were also published on October 13, 1999. These regular reports can be seen as 
updates of the original ￿Country Opinions￿ of the Commission dating from July 1997 in which for the first 
time the Commission evaluated how far the accession countries were in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. 
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￿First wave￿ 
Cyprus  V V  V  +/-  Medium 
term 
2003 Political  problem: 




V  V  In the medium 
term; losing 
ground  
+/-  Medium 
term 
2003-2005 Slowdown  in 
transposition; 2004-
2006 




2003  Very open to trade 
and FDI; 2004-2005 




2002 Strong  commitment 
towards reform; 
2003-2004 




2002 Large  agricultural 
sector: potential 
problems in CAP; 
2003-2005 




2003 Slowdown  in 
transposition; 
2004-2007 








In the long term  --/++  Long term  No official 
target 
End of next decade 
Latvia  V In  the 
medium term 







V In  the 
medium term 




2005 Slowdown  in 
progress; 2005-2008 
Romania  V Worrying 
developments
; long term 
In the long term  ---/-  Long term  No official 
target 
Stabilisation not 
achieved; More than 
a decade away 
Slovakia  V In  the 
medium term 







The European Commission￿s View 
 
The European Commission has not committed itself to any end-date for the accession 
negotiations. It has agreed to negotiate on the basis of the accession target dates as set by the 
accession countries. The official stance of the EC is that a first wave country will be ready to 
become a member of the EU in the medium term as long the country in question continues its 
efforts to adopt and implement the conditions of the Acquis. The official line of the 
commission furthermore is that countries will not necessarily join in waves; each country will 
be accepted into the Union on its own merits. 
  
                                                 
9   N.B: V = condition satisfied, +++ = excellent, ++ = very good, + = satisfactory, for the minuses the 
opposite applies. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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For the second wave countries the EU has only given very vague indications of the likely 
duration of the accession negotiations (which, as we have seen, have not formally started with 
these countries).  
 
 
The Accession Countries￿ View 
 
The first wave accession countries have set target dates for EU membership during the 
negotiation process with the Commission, all in the 2002 ￿ 2005 period. Second wave countries 
in general have either only recently given an indication of their targets or not taken any formal 
positions on this issue. The target dates are reported, as available in Table 1.1. 
 
For all applicant countries EU membership is at present the most important foreign policy aim of 
the presiding government and can also (still) count on broad support in society as a whole. Now 
that the implementation of the Acquis has started to influence the position of some vested 
interests, however, (abolition of state aid, free acquisition of land by EU citizens) the support for 
EU membership has increasingly come under fire in some applicant countries. 
 
 
 The views of independent commentators 
 
In the academic literature various comments have been made about the duration of pre-accession 
period. The most important of these are: 
 
•  Comment 1: A comparison with the accession process of Spain and Portugal (in 1986) 
could be pertinent. These negotiations lasted for almost 10 years. Since then the Acquis has 
become much more complex and further reaching as to harmonisation of legislation and co-
ordination of (economic) policy. 
 
•  Comment 2: The level of economic development of the most accession countries is much 
lower than that of Portugal and Spain at the moment these countries entered the EU. In graph 
1.1 we present the levels of GDP per capita relative to average EU GDP per capita, first for 
Spain and Portugal in 1986 and then for first and second wave applicant countries in 1998.
10 
Because per capita income and productivity levels are so much lower than the EU average, 
entry into the EU might induce large migration flows that would be unacceptable for present 
EU member states. 
 
                                                 
10   GDP levels could also be presented in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, an economic measure for 
comparing actual domestic spending power of consumers. For a level comparison with Spain and Portugal 
at their time of accession a depiction in PPP terms would not provide any additional insights. Moreover 
GDP levels in PPP terms, which can be found in annex A for all the accession countries, tend to overstate 
the level of economic development of developing and transition economies. GDP in monetary terms, 
however, tends to understate it.  EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 




•  Comment 3: The CEE accession countries are still in a process of economic transition from 
centrally planned to market economies despite the great strides they have made in recent 
years. Some major sectors of the economy of these countries (steel, agriculture, banking, 
mining) still face major restructuring efforts. In a number of countries privatisation programs 
still have quite some way to go. In annex A we present country profiles in which the 
progress of the transition process for each individual country is discussed. There are large 
differences between the countries involved in accession with respect to the success of 
transition. Countries like Romania and to a lesser degree Bulgaria lag significantly behind.  
 
•  Comment 4: Because transition still has quite some way to go, the adoption of the Acquis 
may be realised on a formal level, but actual implementation may be much more difficult. 
The European Commission itself points to this danger in its 1998 and 1999 Composite 
Papers. 
 
•  Comment 5: A few countries face political obstacles in being ready in a political sense for 
EU membership. This is the case for Cyprus where the split between the Greek and Turkish 
part has not been resolved. In Slovakia democratic rights and institutions have greatly 
improved recently but are as yet not solidly grounded. 
 
•  Comment 6: The question whether the EU has already straightened out its Common 
Agricultural Policy in such a way that an integration of the accession countries in the EU 
would be financially feasible given the present EU budgetary framework, is still open
11. 
According to Commission officials the framework decided on at the Berlin summit 
(basically: price, but no income subsidies for farmers in the accession countries) would make 
                                                 
11   See, among others, Baldwin, R., 1995 and Koop, M., 1997. 
Graph.1.1.      
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the CAP financially sustainable. The accession countries, who ￿ it should be noted- 
negotiate with the EU not as a group but individually, do still have to accept this framework. 
 
•  Comment 7: The EU still has to reform its internal decision-making structure (composition 
of the Commission, voting structure partly based on population, majority voting). Outside 
commentators, but also the Commission itself, view the EU becoming unworkable with 27 
Member States, if these reforms are not made. 
 
•  Comment 8: The Kosovo-crisis has induced considerable political momentum to speed up 
the accession process to ensure political stability in Eastern Europe and to mitigate the 
negative economic effects of the recent military conflict.  
 
•  Comment 9: The EU might agree with relatively early accession to the EU, accepting 
substantial temporary derogations on the part of the accession countries with regard to 
certain elements of the Acquis. In return certain budgetary rights and perhaps the freedom 
with respect to the movement of workers for the accession countries might be slowly phased 
in. This option would make it possible for accession countries to complete the transition 
process of their economies within the EU.  
 
Of these nine major comments, only the last two seems to point at a speedier integration in the 
EU than aimed at by accession countries. Most commentators especially view the transition 
issue ￿ which is linked with adoption and especially with implementation of the Acquis - and the 
reform of the CAP as major stumbling blocs. The durability of the Balkan-crisis argument 
furthermore cannot really be evaluated at this time. 
 
Consequently, most commentators estimate an accession period somewhat longer than 
that envisaged by the accession countries themselves. 
 
An interesting concept in this respect is that which is referred to in the academic literature as 
￿real convergence￿. Real convergence is usually referred to in two ways. First, there is the aspect 
of the restructuring of the old economic system and the approximation of the EU market-
institutional and legislative framework. Secondly, there is the aspect of catching up with the 
productivity and per capita income levels of mature, developed market economies, like those of 
the European Union. 
 
A transition economy is hypothesised to be only able to fully profit from EU membership, and 
later on from Euro area membership, when, both aspects of real convergence have taken place to 
a certain extent. While the EU has encompassed the first (restructuring and institution 
building) aspect into its Copenhagen criteria, income and productivity levels are not 
criteria for EU membership.  
 
In the economic literature it is viewed as conceivable that a certain threshold also with respect to 
productivity and income levels will have to be passed before EU membership will really have 
the effect of accelerating the process of ￿real convergence￿ for the accession countries. No 
indication of the level of this threshold level has been presented, however. Furthermore, a major 
political problem could be that catching up in income and productivity would push accession 
many years into the future. 
 
For example, a recent IMF study (Fischer, S., et al., 1998), calculated the time required for 
CEE countries to catch up with the Southern EU member countries (Greece, Portugal and EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Spain
12). The time periods for real convergence, calculated under the assumption
13 of steady 
and more rapid income growth of the CEE countries, were, relative to the year 1995: 28 to 29 
years for Bulgaria, 11 to 15 years for the Czech Republic, 16 to 17 years for Estonia, 20 to 22 
years for Hungary, 23 to 25 years for Latvia, 33 to 24 years for Lithuania, 18 to 23 years for 
Poland, 34 to 36 years for Romania, 15 to 19 years for Slovakia and 19 to 24 years for 
Slovenia. In other words, it will be a generation-long process,  even under beneficial 
macro-economic circumstances, for most accession countries to catch up in real terms 
with the EU￿s poorest states. 
 
Of course, full convergence, even with the Southern EU Members, is not a condition sine qua 
non for accession to happen. The present EU has sizeable differences in economic prosperity 
and even individual nations have huge gaps in development inside their territories. These 
calculations do suggest the long-term nature and very substantial size of EU structural funds 
required for these countries and the need for real wage levels attuned to productivity 
development.  
                                                 
12   In a 1996 study (see Baros & Garoupa, 1996) the ongoing process of real convergence towards the EU average 
(the start of which preceded actual EU membership) of both Iberian economies, Portugal and Spain, was found 
to have been positively and significantly affected by EU membership (these results where confirmed for 
Portugal by an updating of the study by Vinhas de Souza in 1999: see Vinhas de Souza, L., 1999(c)).  
 
  This would mean that the real convergence process of the accession countries could be similarly affected by 
EU membership, reducing the necessary time span to achieve a greater level of development (this is, of course, 
actually one of the strongest underlying motivations for these countries to seek EU membership in the first 
place). The question would then be: what is the convergence ￿threshold￿ that these countries would have to 
have for this positive reinforcing effect to appear (which would also be convergence level that would be ￿safe￿ 
for the EU to accept these countries). 
 
13   Long-term real growth rates of the Southern EU Member States was put at 2 percent while those for CEE 
countries ranged from 4.4 to 7. 1 based on varying assumptions on fundamental factors determining long-
term economic growth. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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1.2  Integration into EMU 
1.2.1 Procedures 
 
As stated in paragraph 1.1.1 the new entrants to the EU will not be allowed an ￿opt-out￿ 
clause for the Economic and Monetary Union as was used by the United Kingdom and the 
Kingdom of Denmark. This means that all future entrants into the EU are supposed 
eventually to become members of the common currency area, which became a reality 
with the introduction of the Euro in 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) member states, 
in January 1999
14. This follows from the Amsterdam Treaty (AT), which declares that all-
future member countries ￿shall adhere to the goals of EMU￿. It was spelled out more 
explicitly by the general commitments in the pre-accession agreements signed by the new 
entrants with the European Commission. 
 
In its 1998 Composite Paper on the progress of applicant countries in meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria, the European Commission also presents its views on the phasing of EMU integration for 
the future member countries. The EC envisages a three-phased process (see EC, 1998 (b); For a 
full description of the proposed phasing and its time frame, see Box II, page 11).  
 
The first phase is the pre-accession phase, during which the accession states shall fulfil the 
general EU membership criteria. The second is the accession stage, in which the accession 
countries are already in the EU but still outside the Euro area. In this phase they shall treat 
￿exchange policy as a matter of common interest￿ and (eventually) co-ordinate exchange rate 
policy through and ERM-like mechanism
15. The third and final phase is the actual Euro phase
16.  
 
So contrary to the view of some of the accession countries the European Commission is now 
very clear that there should be a distinct second phase on the road to full integration into EMU. 
The European Commission states explicitly that: ￿new Member States are not expected to 
adopt the single currency upon accession, even though they will be taking part in EMU. EMU 
implies a gradual development of the economies of candidate countries leading to the final 
adoption of the single currency as ultimately all Member States must introduce the Euro (EC, 
1998, ibid)￿. 
The time frame described in the Composite Paper thus excludes a simultaneous accession 
to the European Union and to the common currency framework, the so-called third phase 
                                                 
14  The founding members of the Euro are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The currently non-participating Member States are 
Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
15  At this stage, the governors of the new member countries￿ Central Banks will also join, upon accession, 
their counterparts in the General Council of the ECB, which is a non-voting body that encompasses all EU 
member-countries, regardless of their membership in the Euro area. Actual ECB policy decisions are taken 
by its Governing Council, which encompasses the Governors of the Central Banks of the 11 member 
countries and the 6 members of the ECB board. 
 
16   This phased integration process seems to have been confirmed by the 1999 version of the ￿Composite 
Paper￿, which did not introduce any substantial modifications concerning the EMU integration procedures 
(see European Commission, 1999(a), ibidem). 
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of EMU
17. This impossibility of a ￿simultaneous entry￿ is further strengthened by the EMU 
convergence criteria themselves (see a full description of the criteria in Chapter 2). The third 
Maastricht-criterion is the so-called ￿ERM criterion￿, which states that the currency of any 
future EMU member should have been in the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) without 
devaluation or revaluation for at least two years.  
Since only EU member countries can integrate into the ERM-mechanism (or, rather ERM2, 
which has replaced the old ERM with the introduction of the Euro), an EMU accession could 
only happen at least two years after the EU accession, bar major changes in both the current 
enlargement and monetary integration institutional and legal frameworks.  
 
The exact monetary policy stance of the accession countries in the second phase, i.e. during their 
first years within the EU, was left rather vague in ￿Agenda 2000￿.
18 In its 1998 Composite 
Paper the European Commission now clarifies its position somewhat: it suggests that the 
ERM2 framework is the preferred pre-Euro framework for the Accession countries in this 
phase. Whether ERM2 should start immediately at the moment of accession into the EU, 
is, however still unclear in the Composite Paper. Remarks made by former Euro-
commissioner De Silguy in 1998 seem to suggest that the Commission was at that time 
thinking about a crawling peg regime immediately after EU accession to be followed by 
ERM2. The rationale of course would be that the first mechanism would be conducive to 
monetary stability, but not as restricting for the accession countries as immediate ERM2 
membership. We will come back to exchange rate policy in the accession phase in later 
chapters.  It is important to realise that phase 2 would possibly comprise an as yet 
undefined part and an ERM2 part with a duration of a minimum of two years, in the 
Commission￿s view.  
 
The ERM2 part of phase 2 will aim to ensure that the new Member States will ￿orient their 
policies towards stability and convergence, and help them in their efforts to adopt the Euro￿.
19 
The operating procedures for the new ERM have been defined by the ECB and the non-Euro 
area national CBs
20: the currency of each Member State participating in the ERM2 will have a 
central rate against the Euro and bands of –15%, supported by automatic, unlimited 
intervention at the margins
21. 
 
After a political decision process, the parities in the ERM2 exchange rates grid can be adjusted 
to new levels. The Commission has suggested at various occasion that realignments could 
                                                 
17  This clarifies the statements in ￿Agenda 2000￿, which, in principle, do not seem to exclude a two-phased 
process, in which entry into both the EU and the EMU could be simultaneous, and where no exchange rate 
co-ordination framework was actually specified. 
 
18   ￿all Member States shall￿be in a position to stabilise their exchange rates in a mechanism yet to be 
decided￿. 
 
19  Resolution of the European Council in Amsterdam, June 1997. The Resolution suggested that participation in 
ERM2 would be voluntary for all non-Euro area Member States. An EU Member State which would not 
participate in the ERM2 from the beginning was free to join later.  
 
20  Presently, only Denmark and Greece. 
 
21  However, the ECB and the participating non-Euro area national CBs can suspend this in a situation of conflict 
with internal price stability. The exchange rate coordination in the ERM 2 can eventually be increased by 
tighter currency bands, if deemed necessary. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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become a regular occurrence in ERM2 for those new Member States who are still finding their 














Box 2: ￿Time frame for full EMU membership according to the European 
Commission￿ 
Pre-accession phase: During this phase, candidate countries carry out the economic
reforms needed to fulfil the Copenhagen economic criteria on the existence of a
functioning market economy and on the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union. Meeting the economic criteria will ensure that the
general economic framework ￿ including institutions and policies ￿ is broadly 
compatible with EMU. Specifically, Community legislation on EMU needs to be in
place for accession, namely: 
i)  completion of the orderly liberalisation of capital movements; 
ii)  prohibition of any direct public sector financing by the central bank and of
privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions; 
iii)  alignment of the national central bank statutes with the Treaty, including the
independence of the monetary authorities and respect of the price stability goal. 
These requirements, together with the continued implementation of the proper economic 
policies and reforms will enable candidate countries to participate in EMU upon 
accession without adopting the Euro. The economic and legal framework put in place 
will ensure the capacity to take on other obligations in this field. 
Accession phase: Upon accession, new Member States participate in EMU and have to
comply with title VI of the Treaty. This includes the following obligations: 
i)  adherence to the aims of economic and monetary union; 
ii)  treatment of exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest and, later, 
participation in the ERM; 
iii) treatment of economic policies as a matter of common concern and co-
ordination of economic policies between the Member States through participation in
Community procedures; 
iv)  avoidance of excessive government deficits and adherence to the relevant
provisions of the stability and growth pact;  
v)  further adaptation of the national central bank￿s statutes with a view to
integration in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); 
vi)  progress towards the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria (on
public finances, inflation, exchange rates and long term interest rates). 
Final Euro phase: The participation of new Member States in the Euro area will be
decided in the light of their compliance with the necessary conditions for the adoption of
the single currency, following the examination (via so-called convergence programs) of 
the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence. However, prior to 
accession to the EU, there is no institutional requirement to assess progress made on
convergence criteria. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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As discussed above the minimum duration of the stay of the accession countries in this second 
phase is two years. It could possibly lasts much longer if it is deemed appropriate for the 
economies of the accession countries or for the (stability of the) Euro area. The duration of 
phase 2 will of course also depend on the duration of phase 1, the pre-accession phase. 
 
The possibility of a duration of phase 2 shorter than two years should, however, not be totally 
ruled out. On the exchange rate stability criterion derogations were given in 1998 upon entry 
into the Euro area for Italy and Finland. Moreover, the President of the ECB in recent public 
statements has indicated that the view of the ECB on this point is that ￿a plurality of 
approaches should be feasible without compromising equality of treatment￿.
 22 It has been 
suggested by accession countries that two years of nominal exchange rate stability outside 
ERM2, but equal in performance to that in ERM2, would qualify them on the exchange rate 
stability criterion as described in the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
In our view, a too nominalist approach to exchange rate stability could be detrimental to 
accession countries￿ economic development. For example, as we will discuss in later 
chapters, entering the Euro area (and ERM2) at equilibrium levels of the real exchange rate is 
important. Moreover, article 121 of the Treaty is right in prescribing that the Maastricht 
criteria should be achieved on a sustainable basis. 
 
For entry into the third phase, full participation in the Euro area currency union, the new EU 
Member States will only have to comply with the Maastricht criteria. These criteria are 
convergence criteria in the fiscal and monetary sphere (and will be discussed extensively in the 
next chapter). Once in the Euro area, the new members will also have to adhere to all the 
budgetary rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, like the other Euro area Members.
23 It is 
important to note here that no additional transition-type requirements are to be applied 
for full EMU Membership. In principal these will all have been covered by fulfilment of the 
Acquis conditions for entry into the EU. We will discuss in chapter 4 what type of additional 
criteria have been mentioned in the economic literature for entry into the Euro area as being a 
sensible step both for the accession countries and the present currency union. It should be 
realised that once accession countries are inside the EU full EMU Membership could be 





                                                 
22  The President of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg, in a speech on 26 September, at the headquarters of the U.S. 
Central Bank System, the FED (Federal Reserve System), made the following reference to the flexibility to 
be expected in the use of the Maastricht Criteria for the accession countries: ￿Against the background of 
different starting-points and degrees of economic transition, and the difficulty of ascertaining the lead time 
for further headway towards real and nominal convergence, a plurality of approaches should be feasible 
without compromising equality of treatment. This may apply, in particular, to the timing of EU accession, 
ERM II membership, monetary policies (including exchange rate strategies) before EU accession and the 
development of sound financial market infrastructures￿ (see ECB, 1999(c)). The same flexibility was 
alluded to, in less strong terms, at Duisenberg￿s first speech after the 13 October recommendations, 
delivered at the Bank of Greece, on 15 October, ￿against a background of different starting points and 
varying degrees of economic transition, a plurality of approaches should be feasible without compromising 
equality of treatment￿ (see ECB, 1999(b)). 
 
23  Actually, the Stability and Growth pact already lays down some rules for monetary and budgetary policy 
co-ordination for the accession countries before they enter the Euro area, just as is the case for the present 
non-Euro area Members without an opt-out clause. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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1.2.2 Prospects 
 
In this paragraph we will present the views of the Commission, the Accession countries and 
independent commentators on the duration of the second phase of full integration into EMU 
(between Accession into the EU and into the Euro area). The views on the pre-accession phase 
were presented in paragraph 1.1.2. 
 
The European Commission￿s View 
The Commission has not expressed any expectations on duration of the second phase. It does 
present the required time of two years in ERM 2 as a minimum period. 
 
The Commission assessed in the Country Opinions of 1999 the progress in monetary and 
fiscal convergence achieved before initiation of the pre-accession phase. It concluded that the 
participation of the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia in EMU as a non-participant in the Euro area should 
pose few problems in the medium term, provided that the necessary measures specified in the 
Opinion were taken by each country. Only for Romania the Opinion concluded that its 
participation in EMU as non-participant to the Euro area could still pose serious problems. 
Overall, Hungary seems to be the best prepared country for EU Accession. For all countries, 
the Opinions concluded that it was still premature to judge when they will be ready to adopt 
the Euro.  
 
The Accession Countries￿ View 
First and second wave applicant countries have expressed a range of views on the timing of 
their entry into the third phase of EMU. The individual country entry strategy into EMU is 
discussed at length in Chapter 5 and summarised in Table 5.1. In general the countries 
involved seem to favour relatively early entry into EMU. The reason is that they believe 
that membership of EMU (and EU) would substantially increase trade and investment flows 
to their countries, and, moreover, provide strong credibility for their stabilisation efforts. 
Most countries also seem to favour full membership for political reasons. Domestically it 
would be an important instrument to reinforce the transition process. Externally, EMU 
membership would really make them equal members in the EU and reinforce their integration 
into the EU.  
 
The entry strategy of the accession countries can be roughly split into three groups. A 
number of accession countries (Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia) seem to accept 
that the second phase will contain a two year time period for ERM2. Contrary to the 
Commission these countries have indicated that they see this two-year period as a 
maximum for full EMU membership.  
 
A few accession countries have stated their desire to enter the Euro area at the time of 
entry into the EU (Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia). Politicians in these countries have, at certain 
times, even expressed interest in entering EMU before EU accession. Entry into EMU before 
EU membership and before a two-year period in ERM2 as an EU Member is not possible 
given the present EU legislative framework, as we discussed previously. Slovenia has, 
however, in the accession negotiations made a formal request for an exemption for the 
national currency staying in ERM2 for the required two years. The position of the Slovenian 
government is that if the Tolar has a stable relation to the Euro in the two years before EU EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
PE 168.282  14
membership and complies with the other Maastricht criteria it should be eligible for full EMU 
membership at accession to the EU. Such an exemption would clearly require a political 
decision by the European Council. 
 
Finally, a number of accession countries have not named a target date or period for 
entry into EMU (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania). They do see ￿full EMU￿ as coming 
at least 2 years later than EU Membership. The enthusiasm of this group for early entry 
seems to be waning somewhat under influence of information from the academic world and 
IMF. These countries would possibly be in favour of splitting the second phase in two parts. 
One period involving relatively few restriction on adjusting their real exchange rate (a 
crawling peg, even perhaps a free float ￿ la the UK), and a second part with membership of 
ERM2. 
 
The views of independent commentators 
On the likely duration of the second phase independent commentators have not really made 
any concrete predictions. They have suggested a number of reasons why the second phase 
should probably take longer than that advocated by some accession countries.  
 
•  Comment 1: The catch-up in economic development and the continued transition of the 
CEE applicant countries would induce substantial real exchange rate adjustments (real 
appreciation). A fixed nominal exchange rate would complicate this process and actually 
hurt the accession countries. The consequences of early entry into EMU will be discussed 
at length in Chapter 5. 
•  Comment 2: There is scepticism within the economic profession that the EMU of the 11 
founding members was (and is) a so-called Optimal Currency Area
24. The driving force 
behind EMU has been political rather than economic. This would be even more true for 
the expanded Euro area with 12 accession countries included. Because monetary policy 
would be aimed at overall economic conditions in the Euro area, the countries involved 
would lose a valuable policy instrument to mitigate economic shocks while their 
production structure is still vulnerable. Basically, this argument is a Keynesian argument 
that assumes monetary policy can be used for fine-tuning of the economy. 
•  Comment 3: The attainment of the Maastricht criteria would be a heavy burden for the 
accession countries in the fiscal sphere at a time when these countries should be making 
substantial investments in the transition process. 
•  Comment 4: The low inflation rates required for EMU membership would unnecessarily 
constrain the resolution of disequilibrium prices in the economy which are still present in 
many of the CEE countries.  
•  Comment 5: An unsuccessful entry, and subsequent withdrawal from EMU, would be a 
political disaster. The Euro would lose much of its credibility which would imply 
substantial economic losses for the Euro area as a whole (higher interest rates, Euro not 
an international currency). 
•  Comment 6: If accession to the EU is relatively early, this will only be possible with 
substantial derogations to the Acquis. Full compliance with the Acquis in the fields of 
                                                 
24  See, among others, Bayoumi, T. and Eichengreen, B., 1993. 
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economic and monetary union and in the fields of bank restructuring and price 
liberalisation will be seen, however, by Euro area Members as a pre-requisite for full 
EMU membership. So before the Maastricht criteria come into play the full 
implementation of the Acquis will be the hard nut to crack for the accession countries. 
 
Contrary to this pessimistic view, there is also a (minority) school of thought, which sees 
definite benefits of early entry into the Euro area. For example, the Optimal Currency Area 
Theory is seen as not very relevant for modern, diversified market economies. These critics, 
moreover, point to the fact that accession countries￿ production structure has already 
converged to quite some degree to that of EU countries. In this view the main value of the 
Euro area currency union lies in the ￿free￿ credibility provided to accession countries in the 
field of monetary policy. Inclusion in the Euro area would relieve these countries of all the 
worries of independent monetary policy: real exchange rate consequences of large inflows of 
FDI, possible speculative attacks against the currency, and the balancing of the internal and 
external value of the currency.
25 
                                                 
25  See for example Bofinger, 1994, on the limitations of Mundel￿s OCA-theory and the credibility benfits of 
monetary union. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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2.   Prospects of meeting the Maastricht criteria 
In this chapter we will go into the prospects for the accession countries of meeting the 
requirements of full integration into EMU, i.e. membership of the Euro area currency union, 
once these countries have become EU Member States. For this purpose we will review in 
paragraph 2.1 the Maastricht criteria. These criteria will be the criteria for entry into the third 
stage of EMU of the accession countries just as they were for the founding Members of the 
Euro area.
26 We will discuss whether the application of the Maastricht criteria will present 
any additional problems for the accession countries given the transitional nature of their 
economies. In paragraph 2.2 the progress in monetary and fiscal convergence of the accession 
countries in conforming to the Maastricht criteria will be presented. Finally in paragraph 2.3 
we discuss the views of the EU, the accession countries and independent commentators on 
the likely speed of the Maastricht criteria being met. 
 
 
2.1  The Maastricht Convergence Criteria 
A number of numerical benchmarks were defined in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty. 
These so-called EMU or Maastricht Convergence Criteria aim to ensure monetary and fiscal 
stability in the joint currency area. The criteria force the countries which want to become full 
EMU members to converge in the monetary and fiscal sphere. Two of the criteria are monetary, 
one is linked to currency rate stability, and the final one is fiscal. The criteria are: 
 
i)  The Inflation Convergence Criterion, defined as an inflation rate which should not 
exceed by more than 1.5% the average inflation rate of the three best-performing 
countries; 
 
ii)  The Interest Rate Convergence Criterion, meaning that the average long-term nominal 
interest rate should not be more than 2% above the average interest rate of three 
countries with the lowest inflation rate; 
 
iii)  The ERM Criterion which postulates that the currencies of future EMU members 
should have been in the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) without devaluation or 
revaluation for at least two years
27; 
 
iv)  The Excessive Debt Criterion is composed of a budget deficit component, which 
declares that a country￿s budget deficit should not exceed 3% of its GDP, and of a stock 
of debt component, which states that the stock of outstanding government debt should 
not exceed 60% of that country￿s GDP (or otherwise be in a descending sustainable 
trajectory towards these benchmarks). 
 
Additionally, an ￿operational￿ criterion was also set, concerning the legal and institutional 
features of the national Central Bank (CB), namely, its independence from government 
                                                 
26   A semantic discussion could be whether these countries can enter the third stage of EMU while this stage 
has already started for 11 Member States as of 1January 1999. 
 
27  The 1992 ERM crisis made the narrow bands of the then functioning ERM of +/- 2,25 % not sustainable. 
These bands were replaced by the current +/-15% margins, which allow major currency moves without the 
direct need for intervention or realignment. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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interference
28, a mandate towards price stability, the prohibition of monetary financing of 
deficits, and the availability of a set of market-based instruments that enable the CB to conduct 
monetary policy actions. 
 
The economic rationale behind the criteria is that deficits have to be sustainable, from an inter-
temporal point of view
29, and that inflation and exchange rate instability are negative factors 
for economic growth from a long-term allocation perspective
30. The justification for CB 
independence is related to the so-called ￿time inconsistency￿ question, which would also lead 
to a lower level of aggregate welfare
31. Also, in systemic terms, instability should not be 
transferred from individual members of the Union into its aggregate
32. As a group, the criteria 
have been often described as ￿common sense macro economic policy￿. 
  
The application of the criteria is not automatic. If the national figures are temporarily off target 
but in a continuous and sustainable trajectory towards the benchmarks, exemptions from these 
criteria can be made. Such exemptions were made by the European Council decision that 
selected the founding members of the Euro area. With regard to the fiscal criterion, exemptions 
were made for Belgium and Italy, with regard to the ERM criterion, for both Finland and Italy. 
These past exemptions may indicate that accession countries are right in expecting in a 
future selection process a similar degree of flexibility at the political level. 
 
As to the applicability of the Maastricht criteria to accession countries, and especially to the 
transition economies amongst them, the following remarks may be pertinent. 
 
•  According to some studies (See European Parliament, 1999), the very existence of the 
Euro area as a de facto common currency area would imply changes in the criteria, 
namely, in the inflation and interest rate criteria. According to this interpretation, the 
reference benchmark should no longer be the three best performing countries, but the 
                                                 
28  More precisely, ￿instrument independence￿, and not ￿goal independence￿ (since the goal is pre-defined as 
being price stability: see Fischer, 1995). 
  
29  Some of these numerical benchmarks seem to have been derived from the application of a ￿golden rule￿ 
growth condition on ￿back of the envelope￿ long run forecasts for growth and inflation in the Western 
European economies. 
 
30  On a very basic micro level, the prices of goods and services, in a market economy, function as indications 
of their relative scarcity. Private individual agents, to be able to take adequately maximizing decisions, 
need to ￿read￿ the information expressed in those prices as clearly as possible. Both inflation and exchange 
rate instability distort this information, leading to non-maximizing decisions and lower than optimal 
aggregate welfare. Price and wage rigidities existing in market economies imply that the CB￿s usually 
interpret price stability as meaning an inflation rate between 0 and 2%. 
 
31  Under the assumption of short term non-neutrality of money, i.e., a short run Phillips curve, implying a trade-
off between inflation and employment, government authorities with a limited time-horizon would have an 
incentive to produce surprise inflation in an attempt to generate an increase in output. Rational economic 
agents would anticipate such behavior, and the final, sub-optimal outcome would be lower growth with 
higher inflation. A committed central banker, with lower than average tolerance for inflation or a framework 
of principal/agent with a binding contract with the CB would (in theory) solve such a problem, bringing the 
economy back to an optimal path (see Walsh, 1995 and Svensson, 1997). 
 
32  To try to impose a more binding constraint on the fiscal behaviour of the member countries of the Union, a 
system of punitive pecuniary fines was introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), through which 
￿after a lengthy joint political decision process- individual member countries that incur non-cyclical 
excessive deficits would transfer up to 0.5 of their GDP to the Union. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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inflation and long-term interest rates of the Euro area itself.
33 Others dispute this 
interpretation, stating that the TEU remains unchanged concerning this subject and, 
therefore, the application of the criteria should follow the letter of the Treaty. In practice 
convergence towards the Euro area as a whole will of course be easier than towards the 
three countries with the best inflation performance. Entry into a existing currency union is 
fundamentally different than founding one with a group of nations. In our opinion, for the 
accession countries the Euro area as a whole should be the frame of reference.
34 
 
•  The interest rate criterion may pose problems as applied to most accession countries as 
they do not have a functioning long-term bond market yet (10-year maturity). This means 
there are no long-term interest rates to compare to a Euro area benchmark. Once 
economic stabilisation is firmly entrenched in these countries most commentators, 
however, expect the maturity of long-term government bonds to increase. 
 
•  The formal independence of accession country CB￿s has greatly improved over the last 
few years. In several countries the informal situation is, however, less well defined. In 
practice some CB￿s still receive their orders from national governments. 
 
•  With regard to CB financing of government (or other forms of privileged access to 
finance) accession countries are in the process of conforming with EMU standards. 
 
•  The ￿operational￿ criterion on CB independence also assumes the CB can use indirect 
monetary policy instruments, like open market policies and reserve requirements. In 
countries with a currency board arrangement (CBA) these instruments can not really 
function adequately (see the next paragraph). Entry into EMU assumes an ￿exit-strategy￿ 
from the CBA before this criterion can be seen to be fulfilled. The EC in its Composite 
Paper, however, seems to suggest that a CBA operated by an independent monetary 




2.2  Progress on convergence to ￿Maastricht￿ 
We can see how the applicant countries would currently fare regarding the Maastricht criteria 
in Table 2.1. The values in bold indicate that these macro figures still surpass the Maastricht 
reference values indicated in the top of the table. The data used in Table 2.1 are official 
figures for, in most of the cases, the third quarter of 1999 (or 1998 yearly data, in the case of 
the ￿Excessive Debt Criterion￿) and was supplied by either the respective national central 
banks, the IMF or the ECB. 
                                                 
33   These proponents state that in particular the discussion of country inflation rates is no longer relevant in a 
currency union as individual country inflation is no longer a target of monetary policy. Differences in long-
term interest rates similarly do not reflect monetary policy conditions but rather market liquidity and credit 
rating of the country debt.  
 
34   An awkward consequence could otherwise possibly be that accession countries would have to converge 
towards three Euro area countries going through a recession. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Central Bank (b). 
 
Source: BCE, IMF, ECB and respective National Central Banks; (a): Interbank rate; (b) Lending to 
Government is still permitted; (c) Capable of engaging in some types of open-market operations; (d) 
Ceiling on domestic interest rate. Values in bold indicate a transgression of the Maastricht criteria. See 
annex D for the identification of all the data in the table. 
 
 
Only interest rates are above the benchmark
35 for most of the countries, reflecting high real 
interest rates for these countries, underdeveloped capital markets and the fact that inflationary 
                                                 
35  Note that both the Euro area benchmarks for long term interest rate and inflation used in the table above do 
not conform to the strict Maastricht Treaty(MT) definition, since they are ECB-produced GDP-weighted 
averages of the national figures. Strict MT benchmarks would be much more stringent. As an example, the 
non-weighted average HICP (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) for the three best performing 
Euroarea countries ￿Austria, France and Germany- for the same period is a mere 0.67%, with the result 
that only Bulgaria and Lithuania would fall within the 2.2% upper boundary for the ￿Inflation Criterion￿. It 
must be noted that even in long-standing common currency areas, substantial inflation differentials among EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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expectations have not really subdued yet. It must also be noted that for the long-term interest 
rate proxies were used with much shorter maturity than the 10-year bond rate used for 
evaluating ￿Maastricht￿ for the 11 Euro area Members. For Romania we even had to use the 
Interbank rate. 
 
On the face of it, the fiscal situation for these countries is, in general terms, rather positive 
perhaps, even better that the average fiscal situation for either the Euro area or the whole set 
of EU members, especially concerning the Debt Stock to GDP ratio. Only Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Romania breach either one of the two fiscal sub-




As a result of the surprisingly fast deflationary process of the past few years, caused in part 
by the introduction of tighter monetary policies, the inflation criterion is now also respected 
by most of the countries. The deceleration of inflation was assisted by the emerging markets 
                                                                                                                                                        
regions are systematically found: secular price series for, among others, the United States of America, the 
Commonwealth of Canada and the Federative Republic of Brazil attest to that. Focusing on the U.S. case, 
inflation rates produced by the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics for the major metropolitan areas are 
available since 1919. They show price differences with a maximum of over 7 percentage points as recently 
as the early 1980s, and such intra-national price differences are persistent in time, but not permanent. 
Surprisingly, the U.S. regional inflation differential in the 1990s are around 2.0%, with a variance of 0.6%, 
values remarkably similar to the ones in the EU￿s HIPC (see ECB, 1999 (a)). One of the reasons for this 
somewhat surprising result (since the U.S. has been a currency union for substantially longer than the EU, 
and is undoubtedly more integrated in several respects, a larger differential could be expected) seems to be 
that EU national economies are much more diversified than U.S. regions, and are, therefore, less prone to 
region-specific price shocks. 
 
  Calculating the interest rate benchmark by using the unweighted average of the ten year national 
government bond for the three ￿best performers￿ in inflation terms would require using, early November 
1999, 5.12% for Germany, 5.21% for Austria and 5.23% for France, resulting in a non-weighted average of 
5.19%. That wouldn￿t modify the set of Accession Countries presently conforming to this criterion, but is 
significantly different to the weighted average.  
Graph 2.1: Inflation rates in the "first wave" CEE 
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crisis that started in 1997 and reached Eastern Europe in 1998. World market prices were 
tempered, while an economic contraction added to the deceleration of domestic inflation. 
Graph 2.1 presents the remarkable convergence in inflation of the first wave countries. Graph 




Concerning the exchange rate stability criterion, none of these countries is, of course, an 
ERM member yet, but roughly it can be said that the currency board countries (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania), plus Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Latvia have had 
relatively stable currencies lately, and that Poland, Hungary and Slovenia have had steady 
and relatively moderate currency devaluations. Only Romania seems to have experienced 
serious exchange rate instability recently. 
 
Graph 2.2 presents the nominal exchange rate development of the first wave countries against 
the ECU (index 1993 = 100). For the development of all Maastricht criteria for all accession 
countries from 1992 up to the EBRD projections for the year 2000 we refer to the data-
overviews in the country profiles in Annex A. 
Graph 2.1.a Inflation rates in the "second wave" CEEC
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The actual fulfilment of the operational criterion of an independent CB is a controversial 
question. As already alluded to in the previous paragraph with respect to Bulgaria, Estonia 
Graph 2.2: Nominal exchange rates vs the ECU in 














Graph 2.2.a Nominal exchange rate in the "second 
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and Lithuania, a currency board is by definition an independent organ, but, also by definition, 
one that does not have the means to engage in open market operations. For the other 
accession countries it is a fact that their CBs are now assured a great degree of legal 
independence (in some cases, like Poland and Slovenia, this is even enshrined in their 
Constitutions). The actual relationship between the CB on the one hand and government and 
parliament on the other, however, can be one of conflict (see Radzyner, O. & Reisinger, S., 
1997), with the latter two trying, more or less systematically, to influence the former. Also, in 
several cases, the monetary financing of government deficits is still permitted. 
 
 
2.3  Prospects for meeting Maastricht 
Most of the discussion on the ability of the accession countries to meet the Maastricht criteria 
has been from the academic world. The EU has not made any predictions on this issue, 
focussing as they have on the first hurdle of joining the EU, entering the (second stage) of 
EMU and becoming member of ERM2. These prospects have been discussed in paragraphs 
1.1.2 and 1.2.2. Most accession countries have given the impression that meeting the EMU 
criteria is well within their possibilities given the positive strides they have made in recent 
years. For individual country opinions of meeting Maastricht see paragraph 5.3 on the various 
Euro area entry strategies and/or the country profiles in Annex A. Recently, on the advice of 
the academic community and publications for example by the IMF (Masson, 1999) the 
opinions of accession countries have been shifting somewhat. The ability to reach Maastricht 
is still not cast into doubt, the benefit to their economies is. 
 
 
2.3.1. Views of independent commentators 
 
•  Comment 1: The mostly positive convergence figures must be interpreted very carefully. 
The transition process is still ongoing in virtually all the former centrally planned 
economy countries
36. The twin long-run processes of transition and of catching-up with 
the EU average development level imply both higher average domestic inflation and 
interest rates for the time being. This, in turn, will imply continuous pressures for the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
 
The reasons for these statements are the following. First, the transition process implies 
that prices (for example in the housing sector) are still finding their equilibrium (i.e. 
higher) values. This means structural inflation in transition economies is probably higher 
than in the Euro area even at the same stage in the business cycle. Secondly, the catching 
up with EU levels of productivity and income causes the so-called Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. According to this process, above ￿world level￿ inflation in the accession countries 
is related to the increased productivity in the tradable sector of an economy, where the 
prices tend to equalise with world levels, while below average increases in productivity in 
                                                 
36  Throughout this study we shall concentrate on questions related to the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe. This is justified by the fact that much more studies and information have been produced 
about these economies than about Cyprus and Malta, which are economies nearer EU/EMU standards with 
a consequent smaller need to adjust (according to the latest Country Opinions, they actually have ￿already 
met the criteria of a functioning and competitive market economy￿). Also, as pointed above, the actual 
integration of Cyprus hinges on the ￿unlikely, in the near future- solution of the question of the division of 
the island. Finally, both these island states are ￿and will remain- utterly marginal from both the points of 
view of economic and monetary integration. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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the non-tradable sector generates above ￿world level￿ inflationary pressures. This positive 
domestic inflation differential generates a real appreciation of the national currency if the 
nominal exchange rate is pegged to a low-inflation country. Foreign capital inflows are 
attracted both by the increasing productivity in the tradables sector and by the higher 
interest rate level needed for keeping inflation in check. This in turn ends up 
strengthening the real appreciation process
37. 
 
Contrary to the perception of some authors, the Balassa-Samuelson effect doesn￿t 
disappear with the constitution of a common currency area: this is a mistaken conclusion. 
The Balassa-Samuelson is a real phenomenon with real and nominal effects and, if we 
deal with different currency areas, one additional nominal effect, namely, the exchange 
rate imbalances. The configuration of a common currency area eliminates this nominal 
effect, but not the others (capital, wage and labour adjustments still have to happen). One 
of the reasons for the persistence of substantial inflation differentials in long established 
common currency areas like the U.S. is exactly the differential productive growth 
between economic sectors in different U.S. regions. In common currency areas where a 
￿periphery￿ is catching up with a ￿centre￿ characterised by higher productivity levels, and 
therefore higher income and price levels -a situation that describes not only the current 
but also the future status of the Euro area- such persistence inflation differentials are all 
but inevitable. In fact, the ECB has already calculated the persistence and importance of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the current Euro area
38 According to the ECB 
estimations, 70% of the observed Euro area inflation differential could be attributed to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
 
•  Comment 2: According to most commentators the inflationary pressures in these 
countries could be subdued by these countries if they really wanted to. This would, 
however, damage the growth potential of these countries unnecessarily. 
 
•  Comment 3: The reduction in inflation in the last two years has partly to do with the 
downturn in these economies caused by the Emerging Markets crisis. 
 
•  Comment 4: Concerning the budgetary criteria, the apparently healthy fiscal situation 
probably masks the fact that fiscal definitions of the accession countries are not always 
synchronised with those used by EU members. The definition of fiscal deficit in the 
Maastricht treaty includes deficits of lower levels of government and social security 
schemes. As government transfers have been shifted in recent years in these countries to 
social security schemes, the deficits of these schemes have also been cut away from the 
central government budgetary situation. This, added to unavoidable future financial 
commitments for structural reforms and investments, and coupled with still incomplete 
tax reforms, could indicate a future worsening of the fiscal position in the accession 
countries. Finally, in several countries one-off privatisation revenues have helped 
improve the budgetary situation. See the country profiles in Annex A for country specific 
information. 
 
                                                 
37  See, among others, BackØ, P., 1998 and BackØ, P., and Radzyner, O., 1998. 
 
38  See ECB, pp 42, 1999(a): ￿￿the principal factors underlying potential inflation differential are, apart from 
a number of erratic factors, price level convergence (due both to market integration and to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect) and cyclical divergence￿. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
PE 168.282  26
•  Comment 5: Transition countries have shown great perseverance in the initial stabilisation 
of their economy in keeping their exchange rate pegged against currency baskets or by using 
currency board arrangements (CBA￿s). As the transition process matures (Poland, Hungary) 
transition countries feel more and more the importance of freeing up their exchange rate or 
accepting a moderate rate of inflation to avoid overvaluation. It is, in our opinion, highly 
significant that a country like Hungary, which has progressed furthest in the transition 
process and which, according to all sources, is likely to be the first CEEC to enter the 
EU, fails on all the Maastricht criteria, while a slow reformer such as Romania or 
countries with a CBA (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania) perform better on ￿Maastricht￿. 
 
Rather than viewing these latter countries as early candidates for the Euro area, they should 
be viewed as still being in the stabilisation phase of transition. Having half an eye (or more) 
on the Maastricht criteria as many of the accession countries have stated they have, could be 
detrimental for their transition effort, as we will discuss in further chapters. Having had a 
stable exchange rate link with a Euro-currency (basket) could actually, at the present time, 
mean for several of the accession countries that the country has still quite some way to go in 
the transition of its economy. Only when mature transition economies have done quite some 
catching up with EU productivity levels would a return to a pegging arrangements be 
beneficial for investment and trade flows to these countries. 
 
•  Comment 6: The attainment of the EMU macro convergence criteria for the new entrants 
has to be seen as a set of mid-term goals, to be achieved in a sustainable and permanent 
basis, adequately supported by micro reforms. In practice, the convergence to these 
benchmarks will be reached through paths that will be largely national, and, therefore, 
specific to each of the candidate countries. 
 
Summarising, independent commentators on the whole do not dispute the ability of the 
accession countries meeting the Maastricht criteria in the medium term, but they do 
question whether this would be a wise thing to strive for. 
 EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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3.   The implications of EU economic and fiscal policy co-
ordination for the accession countries 
3.1  Present framework for EU policy co-ordination 
Economic and fiscal policy co-ordination within the EU received a major impetus with the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997. The 
main reason for seeking closer policy co-ordination has lain in the fear that lax fiscal policies 
in some of the Member States, and to lesser extent rigid labour markets, might undermine the 
unified monetary policy to be realised in the third phase of EMU. Or, put differently, without 
economic and fiscal policy co-ordination monetary policy might under certain circumstances 
be forced to be tighter than would be beneficial for the Euro area as a whole. To ensure fiscal 
discipline in all the EU Member States the following mechanisms in the field of economic 
and fiscal policy co-ordination have been agreed upon: 
 
 the broad economic policy guidelines 
 the convergence programmes 
 the excessive deficit procedure (including the stability programs) 
 
Box III gives an overview of what these policy co-ordination mechanisms comprise. On the 
fiscal side these mechanisms basically enforce a continuation, and in certain respects a further 
tightening, of the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
 
For the coming years it is not expected that major new formal initiatives will be taken with 
respect to economic and fiscal policy co-ordination. Some of the larger EU Member States 
(France and Germany) and a number of Commission officials have, however, in the past few 
years indicated their desire to expand economic and fiscal policy co-ordination, within the 
present framework, from the level of discussions on convergence and avoidance of excessive 
budget deficits to a more centralised form of economic and fiscal policy within the Union. 
The necessity of further centralisation of economic policy is, however, still a point of debate 
in the academic literature. Furthermore, the willingness of Member States to further abdicate 
sovereignty in this field can be seriously doubted. 
 
Once accession countries enter the EU they will have the same position with regard to policy 
co-ordination as Greece and Sweden (the so-called ￿countries with a derogation with regard 
to EMU￿).
39 This position implies that they will have to treat economic policies ￿as a matter 
of common concern￿ and adhere to the procedures for economic policy co-ordination of the 
EU. More specifically, the Maastricht Treaty specifies that these countries will have to 
progress towards the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria and, furthermore, under the 
conditions of the Stability and Growth Pact, that they will have to endeavour  to avoid 
excessive deficits. On this latter point the conditions for Euro area Member States are more 
severe: these countries are obliged to avoid excessive budgetary deficits and should strive 
under normal economic circumstances for a situation of close to budgetary balance (or 
                                                 
39   The position of Denmark and the U.K. is governed by their opt-out clauses with regard to EMU in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
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surplus) in their public finances.
40 Furthermore, for Euro area Member States sanctions can 
be imposed if countries, after a certain procedure, have not implemented measures to 




Based on the above, the conclusion seems justified that the present policy co-ordination 
framework, would put the accession countries, once they are EU members, into a 
position in which convergence to the Maastricht criteria (nominal convergence) 
becomes the focal point of their economic policies. On one hand, this conclusion highlights 
the importance for the accession countries to have made substantial progress in real 
convergence of their economies (transformation to a market economy, catch up in income 
and productivity levels) before entering the EU. The reason for this statement is that, as 
                                                 
40   The reason the SGP calls for fiscal positions to be close to balance or in surplus in normal times is to 
provide room for automatic budgetary stabilisers to operate over the economic cycle. In this way, national 
governments should be able to achieve an adequate degree of stabilisation on their own with the traditional 
national instruments for automatic stabilisation. 
 
Box 3.  Economic and Fiscal Policy Coordination in the EU 
 
There are basically three mechanisms for economic and fiscal policy
coordination and surveillance in the EU. 
the broad economic policy guidelines. These have been issued by the European 
Council every year since 1993 and present the Member States￿ consensus opinion
on macroeconomic and other structural economic policies in the medium-term. The 
European Commission reviews each year the implementation of the guidelines by
the Member States in its Annual Economic Report. 
the convergence programmes. Before the start of stage III of EMU all Member 
States without an opt-out clause were obliged to report regularly on their 
convergence towards meeting the Maastricht criteria. These reports contained the
economic strategy the country in question intended to pursue to attain convergence.
The Stability and Growth Pact has made the yearly presentation of convergence
programmes obligatory for all Member States with a derogation with regard to
EMU. This obligation would thus fall on all of the accession countries once
they enter the EU (and are not yet in the Euro area). 
the excessive deficit procedure. This procedure entails that Members States 
avoid ￿excessive deficits￿, which condition embodies both the 3 % deficit limit
and the 60% public debt criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. If countries do
experience an excessive deficit they are obliged to take corrective measures or,
eventually, for Member States in the Euro area, face sanctions imposed by the
European Council. Since the SGP, the procedure has been augmented, again
only for Euro area members, with a surveillance system concerning medium
term fiscal policies. An element of this system are the yearly stability 
programs which each Member States participating in the Euro area is obliged to
present on its budgetary objectives and, if needed, on its measures leading to
fiscal convergence. As noted, the SGP further obliges Euro area countries under 
normal economic circumstances to strive for a situation close to budgetary
balance (or surplus) in its public finances. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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discussed in chapter 2, nominal convergence may slow down, or lay a burden on the process 
of real convergence. 
 
On the other hand, in our view, political pressures (both from the EU and the accession 
countries themselves) might well push candidate countries for early accession into the EU 
before real convergence has progressed sufficiently (the scenario of continued transition 
within the EU). It should be considered whether, under those circumstances, the present EU 
economic and fiscal policy framework, with its focus on nominal convergence, would be 
optimal for the economic development of the countries concerned. Perhaps, for the period 
between EU membership and entry into ERM2 (see figure 3.1, between t1 and t2) the 
policy co-ordination framework for the accession countries should still be more oriented 
to economic restructuring issues and less to nominal convergence. Of course, this does 
not mean that macro-economic stabilisation issues are not extremely important for the 
transition economies. In chapters 4 and 5 we will argue, however, that economic stabilisation 
for a transition economy does not always make both price and exchange rate stability 
feasible, or desirable. This has to do with issues like remaining price liberalisation, inflows of 
foreign direct investment and real appreciation of the currency through the catch-up in 
productivity differentials. 
 
Figure 3.1  Timeline of accession 
 
          t1               t2        t3 
 
 
Once accession countries enter ERM2 the entry into the Euro area should take a minimum of 
two years (barring a political decision to give derogations with regard to the ERM criterion). 
During this period (between t2 and t3), the position of the accession countries with regard to 
EU policy co-ordination requirements will be no different than in the period before ERM2 
membership (except for exchange rate policy issues). The question whether the EU policy co-
ordination framework is well suited for the accession countries in this period depends on how 
ERM2 will be used by the accession countries. We discern two basic options for the ERM2 
framework: 
 
 a minimalist option 
 a medium-term linkage option. 
 
In the minimalist option ERM2 will only be used as the required two-year period of 
exchange rate stability necessary for entering into the Euro area. It would seem appropriate 
with such a relative short-term use of the ERM2 framework that the EU policy co-ordination 
requirements are fully oriented towards convergence to the Maastricht criteria for entry into 
the Euro area. 
 
In the medium-term linkage option ERM2 could facilitate the exchange rate pegging 
strategy of the accession country practically from the start of EU membership (t1 and t2 could 
Accession into EU  Entry into ERM2  Member Euro 
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actually coincide). In this situation ERM2 could possibly last much longer than the minimum 
of two years. The ERM2 framework could accommodate on the one hand the need of the 
accession countries for a nominal anchor to stabilise their economies and on the other provide 
enough flexibility for regular exchange rate realignments to cope with changes of the real 
exchange rate. In such a situation again an extreme focus of the EU policy co-ordination 
framework towards nominal convergence could be detrimental to economic 
performance of the accession countries. How ERM2 will be used will probably differ from 
country to country. In chapters 4 and 5 we will discuss further possible exchange rate 
strategies for the period between EU accession and entry into the Euro area.   
 
Once the accession countries enter the Euro area they will have to comply with all EU policy 
co-ordination procedures spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. As we have seen, 
especially the excessive deficit mechanism for Euro area members, is more stringent than for 
member states with derogation. Entry into the Euro area might, however, in theory 
actually ease convergence pressures on the accession countries￿ transition process. The 
dilemma between exchange rate and price stability which transition countries experience 
under a pegging arrangement is taken from the national macro-economic policy agenda. The 
accession countries could be free to experience somewhat higher inflation levels induced by 
transition and productivity catch-up phenomena, as long as fiscal indicators were not 
affected. The ECB can only take overall inflationary conditions in the Euro area into account 
for its monetary policy decisions. This line of reasoning may lead accession countries to the 
conclusion that it might be optimal for them to let the ERM2 period be as short as possible. 
From the standpoint of stability of the Euro and credibility of ECB monetary policy 
inflationary pressures clearly should not be too divergent.  
 
 
3.2  Policy Co-ordination in the pre-accession phase 
Before the accession countries enter the EU they have no obligation to meet the Maastricht 
criteria. This is clear from the Copenhagen criteria which only state that the candidate 
countries should ￿adhere to the aims￿ of economic and monetary union. In the Accession 
Partnerships it has been agreed that countries do start making headway, however, towards 
convergence with the sound economic conditions prevailing in the Euro area.  
 
The pre-accession instrument for economic policy dialogue between EU and individual 
accession countries, based on the Accession Partnerships, is the so-called ￿Joint Assessment 
of Medium-Term Economic Policy Priorities￿. The Joint Assessments serve as a preparatory 
exercise for the accession countries in the area of economic policy co-ordination. Joint 
Assessments are drawn up by the accession countries in close co-operation with the European 
Commission. So far, only a few countries have completed their first Joint Assessment. 
 
 
The Joint Assessments aim to review regularly the medium-term economic and monetary 
policy strategies of each candidate with a focus on satisfying the Copenhagen criteria for 
membership of the Union. In theory they should deal with transition policies and macro-
economic stabilisation, not with convergence to the Maastricht criteria. 
 
In fact, according to academic sources, various policy statements and the texts of the Joint 
Assessments themselves, the Maastricht Criteria have already played an important role in 
forming the macro-economic policies in many of the accession countries over the past few EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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years. The Commission has, significantly, felt it necessary to express on numerous occasions 
that ￿Maastricht￿ is not part of the entry conditions into the EU. The reason for the influence 
of the Maastricht criteria may lie in their attractive simplicity or in the aim of accession 
countries to make an early entry into the Euro area possible. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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4.   Exchange rate linkages with the Euro area 
The relationship of the set of monetary and fiscal targets in the Maastricht criteria with the 
exchange rate regime is one of dependence and concordance with the macro setting of reforms. 
The exchange rate regime is not an independent aim by itself, and cannot be seen as such. This 
is not only the position of the Commission, but of the national governments themselves (among 
others, see EC, 1999(a) and 1998; Nemenyi, 1998; Polanski, 1999). As such, the analysis of the 
subject separately from the wider macro framework is to some extent artificial. 
 
However, in this chapter we will focus on the development of the exchange rate linkages of 
the accession countries up to the present and discuss the rationale behind them (paragraph 
4.1). Consequently we will go into the question how exchange rate linkages might evolve as 
convergence to full EMU membership nears (paragraph 4.2). We will do this by discussing 
the medium term exchange rate strategy of Poland and Lithuania. In paragraph 4.3 we draw 
some general conclusion  
 
 
4.1  Development of accession country exchange rate linkages  
As a general rule, most transition economies adopted, at some point early in their transition 
process, macroeconomic stabilisation programmes
41 with some form of exchange rate anchor 
(usually a basket of currencies comprising at least the Dmark and the dollar). Many of these 
initial peg strategies where later abandoned or softened, in face of growing external imbalances, 
either relatively swiftly, as was the case in Poland, or spectacularly, in the midst of a speculative 
attack, as was the case in the Czech Republic
42.  
 
It must be noted that the learning curve of these countries (some of them newly independent ￿ 
namely, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which had to build national 
institutions virtually from scratch, including their monetary authorities) has been very steep: 
hardly ten years ago, the currently universal two-tier bank structure was not only absent, but 
irrelevant. The CB, for all practical purposes, was a department of the Ministry of Finance, and 
its only real function was to produce the means of exchange to allow the trading of plan-
determined quantities among private consumers
43.  
 
The development of the institutions able to carry out monetary policy actions, as well as the 
development of the necessary instruments to carry them out took time. Initially, more blunt 
direct monetary control instruments were used (credit ceilings, interest rate caps, high reserve 
requirements, ￿moral persuasion￿, etc.) since: 
                                                 
41  These macro programs encompass, of course, several different policy actions. On the monetary side, one of 
the main initial concerns was the elimination of the monetary overhang: centrally planned economies 
traditionally generated a surplus of legal tender, given the limited amount of goods and services available for 
consumption. A substantial part of this overhang was held by households outside of the former mono-bank 
financial system. The liberalization of prices and external trade, besides the macro balance and allocative 
micro-efficiency issues involved, aimed at eliminating part of this surplus. 
 
42  For a stylised description of the general trajectory, see Halpern and Wyplosz (Halpern & Wyplosz, 1996). 
 
43  Among the state enterprises and government departments, not even this means of exchange function of 
money was necessary: barter ￿inter-unit transfers of goods and services for settlement- was often used 
instead. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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i)  the monetary authorities themselves hadn￿t learned how to use modern, so-called indirect 
monetary policy tools.
44 
ii)  the transmission channels for the proper use of those tools ￿ namely, working financial 
markets, and a banking system with ￿hard budget￿ constraints where absent in these 
economies (and, still are today, but to a much lesser degree) and; 
iii)  the lack of stable relationships among the CB￿s target variables and its instruments. 
 
Only very recently market-based indirect monetary policy instruments ￿ repos, Lombard 
facilities, government securities auctions- have been introduced
45. 
 
The primary goal of a central bank is to maintain price stability. This can be accomplished 
through direct or indirect strategies. To try to meet an inflation target directly assumes some 
sort of stable links between the final target and a monetary aggregate(s), which the central 
bank attempts to influence. These aggregates are the so-called intermediate targets, while 
inflation usually is the final target. There are two possible types of indirect monetary 
strategies, one based on a stable rate of exchange between the domestic currency and the 
currency of a low inflation country, and the other based on controlling the growth rate of a 
domestic money supply aggregate. 
 
The use of any type of pegging regime (simple peg, basket peg and crawling peg) is, 
therefore, equivalent to the use of indirect inflation targeting. If, however, the peg becomes a 
goal by itself (and no longer the underlying inflationary target), pegging arrangements can 
become unsustainable. The usual breakdown in pegging arrangement follows the general 
pattern of initial large inflows of foreign capital (thanks in part to the stabilisation of the 
economy made possible by the peg). The ensuing economic boom causes the real exchange 
rate to appreciate which process is resisted by the nominal peg. As inflationary pressures 
build (helped by unchecked growth in the money supply induced by the capital inflows) 
undervaluation reverts to overvaluation and sentiment towards the currency usually changes 
abruptly. Capital outflows and weakened competitiveness make abandoning the peg 
unavoidable. As Tinbergen showed over forty years ago, having more targets than 
instruments never works in economic policy
46. It is usually considered that only one type of 
exchange rate strategy is truly sustainable from a long-term perspective: the free float
47. All 
other strategies are unstable when faced with exogenous shocks, ultimately collapse and 
therefore require timely adjustment by the monetary authorities. 
  
The extreme case of the currency peg strategy is the currency board arrangement (CBA), which 
requires the official foreign exchange reserves to be ￿ at least- equal to the amount of domestic 
currency issued (at a given fixed exchange rate): under a strict CBA, there is no actual domestic 
                                                 
44   It should be noted that even in Western Europe these policy tools were only slowly and progressively 
introduced between the 1950s and the 1990s. In the Netherlands, for example, where the need for these 
tools were limited due to the very tight peg to the Dmark, open market instruments were only developed in 
the late 1980￿s, and not much used thereafter. 
 
45  It is estimated that, on average, only three years seperated these two distinct phases: it was a much faster 
process that its counterpart in Western Europe (See Radzyner & Riesinger, 1998). 
 
46   See Tinbergen, J., 1952. 
 
47  A full fixing (like the Euro) merges the national currency in a composite currency that floats itself: in these 
terms, a full fixing to the Euro is actually a floating regime, from the point of view of the aggregate. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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monetary policy, since both the monetary base and the level of interest rates are endogenously 
determined.
48 CBA￿s are viewed, notably by the international financial institutions, as the most 
stable form of pegging arrangement. Usually, the choice of a CBA is linked to the need to give 
credibility to a stabilisation policy in a hyperinflation situation. It is also, as in the case of 
Eastern Europe, connected to the inexperience in conducting monetary policy of the monetary 
authorities.  
 
Among its stated advantages, a CBA entails automatic balance-of-payment adjustments, 
essentially in the same way that a gold standard exchange system would operate: in case of a 
deficit in the capital and current accounts, money supply is reduced, causing, ceteris paribus, the 
interest rate to rise, which will lead to i) (sharply) reduced domestic activity and imports, and to 
ii) an increase in foreign capital inflows,). It should also result in reduced inflation expectations 
(depending on the anchor currency chosen). Finally, it should also, in principle, encourage sound 
fiscal policy (the dismissal of monetary policy leaves fiscal measures as the only counter 
cyclical macroeconomic tool)
49. Among its drawbacks, a CBA means not only the loss of 
monetary policy as a counter cyclical tool, but the CBA itself is actually pro-cyclical in 
nature (economic booms and troughs are reinforced). The lack of lender-of-last-resort (LLR) 
features of the CBA by the monetary authority increases both the short run probability and 
effects of financial sector crises (regardless of the beneficial long run effects caused by the 
reduction of moral hazard).  
 
The most fundamental problem of a CBA, nevertheless, lies in the question of real 
misalignment, caused by different inflation rates between the CBA country and the 
country to which the currency is pegged. Usually, the growth of such imbalances is what 
brings about the demise of a CBA (helped along by speculative attacks). Such real exchange rate 
misalignments are a general disadvantage of all pegging arrangements, although realignment is a 
much less problematic adjustment for a currency peg than for a Currency Board Arrangement. 
Crawling pegs are the most flexible forms of pegging arrangement. The various forms of 
currency pegs thus imply a choice between stability and flexibility. 
 
The applicant countries have, at the moment, several different ways of linking their national 
currencies to the Euro area. We will make a condensed presentation of those different linkage 
strategies and how they came about (see Table 4.1). The current arrangements are: 
                                                 
48  Modified CBAs, though, may perform limited monetary policy actions, through the use of some types of CB-
like instruments, like lender-of-last-resort (LLR) facilities or limited open-market operations. 
 
49  It must be noted that this last feature is not automatic, since the CBA does not endogenize fiscal policy. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Table 4.1 Exchange Rate Linkages of the Accession Countries 
 
Country  Currency  Current Exchange Rate Regime  Modifications as from 
Jan.1999 
Expected Future 





Since July 1997: Currency Board 
regime. Peg to the DEM.  
1000 BGL=1 DM.  
Peg to the EUR.  
1 EUR ≈1955, 83 BGL. 
New Leva (=1000 old 







Since1992: Peg to the ECU with a 
central rate of 1,7086 and fluctuation 
bands of +/-2,25%.  
Peg to the EUR with 








Since May 1997: Managed float, with 
informal shadowing of the DEM. 
Exchange rate target of 17 to 19,5 
crown per mark. 
Shadowing of the EUR.   ￿Closer links of our 







Since 1992: Currency board regime. 
DEM peg. 








Since March 1995: Crawling basket 
peg (30% USD, 70% ECU until 1996 
and DEM afterwards), with 
fluctuation bands of +/- 2,25%. 
Crawling basket peg 
(30% USD, 70% EUR). 
Reduced rate of crawling 
by 2000. EUR peg by 





Since October 1993: Peg with the 
International Monetary Fund￿s (IMF) 
SDR. 
  
Eventual change from 





Since 1994: Currency board regime 
(Peg to the USD). 







Since 1989: Sliding basket peg with 
no intervention bands, to ECU, USD, 
GPB (64.8%, 21.7%, 13.5%) 
Sliding basket peg of 
EUR, GBP & USD 









1991-1999: crawling peg against 
DEM, USD, GBP, FRF, CHF 
Sliding basket peg (EUR 
65%, USD 35%).with 
intervention bands (+/-
12.5%)  
Free float before entry in 
ERM II. 
Romania  Leu  Since 1991: Managed float.    50% EUR/USD peg? 
Slovakia  Koruna  Since October 1998: Managed Float.    Slovakia announces a 






Since 1992: Managed float with 
informal shadowing of the DEM. 
  Intention to join ERM II 
at the same time or after 
EU accession. 
 
Source:  IMF, EU, Erste Bank. 
 
 




Cyprus used a peg regime to link its Pound to the ECU from 1992, with fluctuation bands of +/- 
2.25%. In early 1999, this peg was transferred to the Euro. After a decision taken only in 1995, 
the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) replaced in 1996 its main direct monetary instrument - high 
liquidity ratios (20%) - by a uniform reserve requirement of 7%. The main tools for monetary 
policy then became the newly introduced repos/and reverse repos and standing liquidity 
facilities
51. 
                                                 
50  As stated in chapter 1 the distinction between first and second will probably (formally) disappear by 
confirmation by the European Council at the Helsinki Summit of the EU new enlargement strategy, 
including substantive negotiations with all Accession Countries. 
 
51  Cyprus, a former British dependency, also had a 9% cap on interest rate, introduced by the Metropolitan 
Government in 1944, to ￿protect farmers from usury￿. The island nation also has a highly deregulated 
offshore financial centre, which will have to brought in line with EU prudential regulations. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic￿s Koruna followed a peg to a DEM/USD basket until May 1997, which it 
was then forced to abandon after a speculative attack on its currency. The CNB (Ceska Narodni 
Banka or Czech National Bank) follows today a ￿dirty floating regime￿, informally shadowing 
the DMark, while officially targeting the domestic inflation rate
52. As of the beginning of this 
year the Euro has become the informal target. 
 
Among the Eastern European countries endowed with a CB, the Czech Republic can be 
singled out for its ability to hold on to a fixed exchange rate regime for a record period of 
time. The CZK held its basket peg in a very narrow +/- 0.5 band from December 1990 until 
February 1996 (when the bands were extended to +/- 7.5%). The system survived the 
Czechoslovakia partition of early 1993 without disturbances.  
 
The monetary policy intermediate target evolved from the domestic credit volume target 
(1990) to a net domestic asset in the banking system target (1991/92), to, finally, a M2 
(money and quasi money) ￿corridor￿. The initial phase of blunt direct policy instruments (rate 
and credit ceilings) lasted for only two years, essentially ending by October 1992. 
 
The initial choice of a ￿nominal anchor￿ foreign exchange regime was actually defined by the 
stabilisation program jointly designed with the IMF in 1990, with the peg being set after a 
substantial cumulative ￿entry￿ devaluation of 95%. This actually explains the longevity of 
the peg: the devaluation deliberately substantially undershot the ￿equilibrium￿ entry 
level, creating a ￿cushion￿ that permitted a persistent real appreciation of the Koruna 
to be absorbed without changing the parity. The negative effects of this were i) a very high 
initial adjustment contraction of the GDP ￿ a 16% fall in 1991 - and ii) the undervaluation 
￿cushion￿ reduced incentives to real adjustment, with the mounting pressures spectacularly 
exposed by the currency crisis of 1997.  
 
Classically, the violation of the uncovered interest rate parity condition led to the increase in 
short term foreign capital inflows between 1993 and 1995 (when they reached an amazing 
17.4% of the Czech GDP), leading to equally classical and costly sterilisation interventions 
by the CNB (the costs were estimated to equal 0.5 of GDP in 1995 alone) and the subsequent 
fall of the inflows in 1996-97, when the situation was perceived to be increasing 




Estonia has a currency board system administered by the Eesti Pank (Bank of Estonia, BoE) 
which linked its Kroon to the Deutsch Mark by a rate of EEK 8 to DEM 1. Starting from 1 
                                                 
52  The CNB has indicated several times that the integration of the Koruna in the Euro framework is one of its 
aims. Nevertheless, the domestic situation, since the crash of the currency in 1997, is clearly its main short 
run concern. As an aside, the Czech Republic is a good example of the fragility of apparently positive 
macroeconomic developments in a transition economy that lacked adequate micro foundations. As was so 
elegantly put by Buch, C., the micro weakness of the Czech position was ￿… for all too long hidden behind a 
curtain of macroeconomic success￿ (see Buch, C., 1999). EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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January 1999 the Estonian Kroon was fixed against the Euro, at the same conversion rate of the 
DM in the common currency
53. 
 
When adopting a CBA in mid-1992, as a component of a stabilisation and reform package, 
Estonia￿s main aims were stability and credibility. The Ruble was replaced by the Kroon. The 
new, two-tier banking system was centred, from the very beginning, around a currency board 
type of monetary authority. Its main function is the acquisition of hard currency in the 
Interbank forex market. Nevertheless, it also has some monetary policy tools: central bank 
bills (issued since 1993, but in very small amounts), (low) reserve requirements and (unused) 
standing deposit facilities. No LLR instruments are available, and the result of the 1992/94 
banking crisis was that the number of banks operating in the country was reduced to a third of 
its original figure. Capital movements were fully liberalised already by late 1993.  
 
Due to increasing capital inflows (parallel to an increasing trade deficit) and an economy near 
overheating, the real exchange rate has experienced that familiar peg phenomenon, a 
substantial real appreciation. The lack of a more sophisticated set of macro economic policy 
tools, which could enable the monetary authority to cool down the economy and achieve a 
sustainable external balance places doubts on the long-term prospects of the CBA. 
 
Hungary 
The Hungarian Forint is, since 1995, in a crawling peg with a variable pre-announced 
devaluation rate (currently of 0.4% a month) towards a DEM/USD basket (with weights of, 
respectively, 70% and 30%), within a +/- 2.25% intervention band. This basket has been 
converted, since January 1, 1999, into an Euro/USD one, with the same relative shares. The 
MNB (Magyar Nemzeti Bank or National Bank of Hungary (NBH)) and the Hungarian 
Government have already announced their intention to switch to a full (100%) Euro crawling 
peg by January 1, 2000 (See MNB, 1998). 
 
The two-tier banking system was established already in 1987 (Hungary was an early 
reformer), but the current legal framework for the NBH was introduced in 1991 (with several 
additions since). It defined the NBH￿s aims as safeguarding the internal and external 
purchasing power of the Hungarian currency. This implied the problem ￿ clear between 1991 
and 1994, the first phase of the transition - of too many final goals for monetary policy: 
inflation control or external balance. In practical terms, policy emphasis shifted from one to 
the other. This problem was compounded by a postponement of fiscal adjustment. When 
fiscal deficit reached 9% of the GDP in 1995, the situation became unsustainable, resulting in 
the adjustment program of March of that year. This also caused the clear selection of price 
stability as the ultimate goal of monetary policy, with the nominal exchange rate being used 
as an intermediate target: the Forint was devalued by 9% and the current pre-announced 
crawling band system introduced, as a replacement of the previous adjustable peg to a 
DEM/USD basket (with a 50%/50% composition).  
 
The pre-announced devaluation aims to undershoot forward-looking inflation expectations, 
taking into consideration productivity improvements and underpinning desinflation. The 
sustainability of such a regime, of course, depends on the maintenance of fiscal balance and 
on a sensible wage policy. 
                                                 
53  The Eesti Pank, in its last ￿Statement of the Board￿ before the introduction of the Euro, dated 10/12/98, 
declared that the introduction of the Euro and the related change of reference currency for the peg had no 
other implications in terms of monetary or exchange rate policy. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Malta 
Malta uses a peg regime, through which its Lira is linked, to a basket made of the ECU, the USD 
and the GBP, with weights of 64.8%, 21.7% and 13.5%, respectively. Starting in 1999, the 
Central Bank of Malta (CBM) changed the basket￿s composition to the Euro, the USD and the 
Pound Sterling, with weights of 56.8%, 21.6% and 21.6%, respectively (the decrease in the Euro 
and the increase in the GBP reflect the fact that the ECU also incorporated that currency in its 
composition). There are no formal intervention bands. 
 
The Central Bank of Malta (CBM) was created after the island achieved independence from the 
UK in 1964, after the model of the Bank of England, and started operations in 1968. As a fully  
fledged CB, it has the usual set of indirect policy tools: open market operations (its main policy 
instrument), reserve requirements (5%), discount loans, etc. Some exchange controls in capital 
flows still remain. 
 
Poland 
The Polish Zloty is at the moment on a crawling-peg against a basket of currencies, which was 
modified in early 1999 into a Euro/USD basket (the former basket included the Deutsch Mark, 
the American Dollar, the Pound Sterling, the French and Swiss Francs), weighted with, 
respectively, 65% and 35%. Currently, this peg has ￿ widened - bands of +/-12.5 and a ￿ 
reduced - devaluation rate of 0.5% per month.  
 
The choice of a peg exchange rate regime in Poland was linked to the need to fight 
hyperinflation in the country in 1989/90 (i.e., the monetary/exchange rate policy was a part of 
a short-term stabilisation program), at the moment that the two-tier banking system was 
introduced into the country. Additionally, the limited nature of instruments available at that 
time to the NBP (Narodowy Bank Polski or National Bank of Poland) - ceilings, reserve 
requirements, ￿moral suasion￿- conditioned the choice for this policy option.  
 
A very high liquidity in the banking system ￿ caused by an unexpectedly positive situation in 
the balance of payments and the government budget- led to the imposition of very heavy 
reserve requirements of 30% in 1990 (the registered trade surplus was also a result again of 
the substantial undershooting of the ￿entry level￿ exchange rate chosen for the initial peg 
with the USD in 1990). Nevertheless, the sharp economic downturn characteristic of the 
initial stage of transition, experienced by Poland in 1991, led to another devaluation in May 
of that year and to the introduction of a crawling peg of the PLZ to a currency basket (USD, 
DEM, GBP, FRF, CHF) by October. 
 
The 1992/95 period was one of slow desinflation with a parallel development of monetary 
instruments: money market operations and refinancing facilities became the most important 
policy tools. Capital flows were already highly liberalised by 1992. Additionally, the initial 
fall in GDP turned into sustainable export-led growth by 1993, albeit with high 
unemployment.  
 
The classical problem of foreign capital inflows and monetary expansion that developed was 
initially dealt with by the combined reduction of the crawl rate and sterilisation operations, 
and, in May 1995, by the introduction of a crawling band regime with +/- 7% intervention 
bands, increasing the ability of the NBP to pursue an active monetary policy while retaining 
the anchor features of the regime. 
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Slovenia 
Slovenia uses a float system for its Tolar (created in 1991), administered by the Bank of 
Slovenia (Banka Slovenije, BoS), with the BoS targeting a domestic money aggregate (M3: 
money, quasi-money and time deposits), and informally shadowing the DEM.  
 
This set-up has been successful so far (in spite of widespread indication schemes in the country, 
especially of wages and interest rates
54), delivering both desinflation and external balance, with 
only minor exchange rate adjustments: during 1996/97, the Tolar experienced a nominal 
depreciation of 6.9% to the DEM. The currency stability is, in the view of Slovenian 
authorities, due, in part, to the restrictive legislation concerning capital inflows. 
 
The BoS is a fully fledged CB, created, as an independent entity, after the separation of the 
country from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (it already existed even 
before independence, since the former Bank of Yugoslavia actually operated as a federation of 
regional central banks, uncannily similar to the ECB. 
 
 




Bulgaria uses a currency board regime, which linked its Lev to the DEM up to the end of last 
year. It was introduced as part of a one-year stand-by IMF programme in the Spring of 1997, 
which aimed to bring macroeconomic stabilisation to the country (one of its results was to 
almost immediately bring hyperinflation down from over 1,000% a year to around 5%). 
Starting from January 1999, the anchor currency of the arrangement became the Euro.  
 
Bulgaria went through a conventional transition stabilisation programme in the early 1990s, 
which proved to be unsuccessful: neither disinflation nor external balance was reached. As a 
result of that, the IMF started to press the Bulgarian authorities, already by November 1996, 
to introduce a CBA, against the initial opposition of a sceptical BNB (Bulgarian National 
Bank). With the worsening of the crisis by the spring of 1997, this plan was finally accepted, 
as a part of a comprehensive package of stabilisation reforms (including fiscal consolidation 
and wage and price reforms), and implemented by mid-1997. The CBA was installed upon 
the modified structure of the BNB, who phased out all its monetary operations, retaining only 
the minimum reserve requirement tool. The CBA-￿entry￿ rate of the Lev was 1.000 to 1 
DEM. 
 
Broadly speaking, the short-lived CBA experience in Bulgaria is so far successful: inflation 
has been substantially reduced, external balance has been achieved and the economic 
contraction seems to have bottomed out. Due to the perceived fragility of the situation, 
though, no serious planning concerning the replacement of the CBA has yet been developed. 
 
                                                 
54  These interest rates are capped, the ceiling being set by a cartel of banks: see Pautola, 1998. 
 
55  Again, as noted in footnote 50, the status of this group of countries is likely to change at the Helsinki 
summit. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Latvia 
Latvia uses a peg regime, through which the Lats, the currency which replaced the temporary 
Latvian Ruble or ￿Rublis￿ (which was the country￿s first step to monetary independence from 
the ￿Ruble Zone￿, and lasted from May 1992 to October 1993), is linked to the IMF￿s 
fiduciary account unit, the Special Drawing Rights (SDR, which is actually a basket of 
currencies of IMF member countries). The SDR￿s weights actually roughly reflect Latvian 
external trade composition (only a third of its foreign trade is with the Euro area), but another 
reason for this choice is the fact the creation of the Latvian currency was one of the results of 
the IMF-backed stabilisation programme of 1992 (see Nissinen, 1999). There are no 
immediate plans to change this arrangement (see Repse, 1998). 
 
The Bank of Latvia (Latvijas Banka), BoLa uses the exchange rate peg to the SDR as an 
intermediate target and net domestic assets as an operational target. As a fully fledged CB, it 
has the standard set of indirect monetary policy tools: repurchase agreements (￿repos￿), a 
treasury bill market, reserve requirements (uniformly held at the 8% introduced in July 1993), 
and also LLR facilities, which it chose not to use during the 1994/95 banking crisis, arguably 
the most severe of the wave of Baltic financial sector crisis in the first half of the 1990s: the 4 
major banks among the 17 that collapsed accounted for 46% of all private deposits, and that 
in an environment without deposit insurance. The Bank of Latvia decided instead to use that 
opportunity to introduce sweeping regulatory and prudential reforms to consolidate the 
financial sector. 
 
Peculiarly, the Latvijas Banka, in spite of deviating from its Baltic neighbors on using a CBA 
strategy, has emulated one feature of it, namely, aiming to keep near 100% of its domestic 
liabilities covered by foreign reserves (the lowest point was reached exactly during the banking 
crisis period, when they reached 60-70%: see ˜im￿, 1998). 
 
Lithuania 
Lithuania uses a modified currency board arrangement, introduced in 1994, which pegs the 
Lithuanian Litas to the USD. Its monetary authority, the BoLi (Lietuvos Bankas, Bank of 
Lithuania) has available to it certain types of market based instruments, and it also has a clear 
strategy to evolve towards a fully fledged CB.  
 
Lithuania, like its two Baltic neighbours, reappeared as an independent state in the early 
1990s (in modern times, it had experienced only a brief period of autonomy from 1919 to 
1940), with the collapse of the Soviet Union, to which it had been annexed after the military 
invasion of 1940.  
 
The Rouble was initially replaced, as in Latvia, by an interim coupon currency issued by the 
newly created BoL, from May to October 1992, and them by the Talonas, which was, on its 
turn, replaced by the Litas in June 1993. The Talonas, initially in a float regime, lost over 
50% of its value between its introduction and April 1993. Some exchange rate stability was 
regained with the introduction of the Litas. Nevertheless, the government, with the support of 
the IMF, decided to press for the constitution of an Estonian-type CBA as early as October 
1993, against the will and the advice of the BoL. The CBA was introduced in April 1994 ￿
upon the unchanged administrative structure of the BoL. Its CBA, therefore, since the very 
beginning, has to be characterised as a modified CBA, since some CB instruments (like EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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reserve requirements and short term credit facilities, including for LLR operations: all those 




Romania uses a dirty float regime, with the National Bank of Romania (NBR) intervening in 
the market to support the Leu in a discretionary fashion. 
 
Slovakia 
Slovakia used a peg regime with intervention bands, through which the National Bank of 
Slovakia (NÆrodnÆ Banka Slovenska, NBS) pegged its Koruna to a basket made of the DEM 
and the USD (with weights of, respectively, 60% and 40%). The intervention bands had to be 
progressively widened since the introduction of the regime in 1996, from +/- 1.5% to +/- 
7.0%. After a series of speculative attacks, the NBS was finally forced to abandon the peg 
and float the Koruna, in October 1998. 
 
The Slovakian CB was created only in 1992, and entered into operation in 1993, after the 
break up of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. Its main objective is the stability of the 
Slovakian Crown (￿Koruna￿, SKK). The exchange rate regime was initially a fixed peg to a 
basket (USD, DEM, ATS, CHF and FRF, with weights of 49.06%, 36.16%, 8.07%, 3.79% 
and 3.79%, respectively) in the Czech model, accompanied by a domestic M2 growth target 
(￿supporting economic growth￿ was added to its list of aims in 1995) as an intermediate 
target. The currency basket of the peg was modified to USD/DEM on July 14, 1994 
(40%/60%). 
 
The period 1993/1994 corresponds to the stabilisation years for the new SKK, with a 
relatively small devaluation ￿entry￿ of 10% in 1993. The set of instruments initially used was 
more blunt than its Czech counterpart (credit limits, restrictions to the internal convertibility 
of the currency ￿ which only became ￿Article VIII￿ compatible, i.e., convertible according to 
IMF requirements in October, 1, 1995 - and reserve ratios), in spite of the availability of the 
discount and Lombard rates and repo and Treasury bill auctions instruments since 1993. In 
1996, to deal with the usual problem of capital inflows in peg regimes, reserve requirements 
were raised to an uniform level of 9%, the SKK bands were widened from 1.5 to +/- 3% and 
then to +/- 5%. 
 
 
4.1.3. Overall conclusions 
 
A conclusion of the above review of pre-accession exchange rate regimes is that the specific 
national choice of linking strategies is influenced by the specific structural characteristics of 
the applicant countries￿ economies, like export structure and the susceptibility to exogenous 
shocks, but also to progress of the transition process.  
 
The CBA strategy is used either by small, very open (trade surpasses GDP in both Estonia 
and Lithuania) and not very diversified transition economies, whose reliance on external 
demand makes fast adjustments to international price movements essential, or by countries that 
                                                 
56  Almost uniquely among CBAs, the exchange rate of the Litas can be changed by a Government decision, 
albeit one made in consultation with the BoL. This has led some authors to question if the Lithuanian 
arrangement deserves to be called a CBA at all (see ˜im￿, 1998). EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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still need to use the currency board to stop a run-away inflationary process (which was the 
case of Bulgaria)
57. The CBA implementation is also usually supported by international 
financial institutions (namely, by the IMF). 
 
The choice of a pegging anchor or basket usually reflects the trade composition of the 
country in question (it may also incorporate other considerations, like, in the case of 
Poland, a large USD-denominated external debt)
58, and the speed of the sliding and its 
intervention bands reflect either the dimension of the inflation differentials or the speed of the 
productivity increase. The use of a float regime, may, in some cases, not be the result of an 
actual policy choice, or a part of a liberalisation strategy (as in the case of Poland, see below), 
but it may have been imposed by the markets, due the inability of the country in question to hold 
on to a peg or shadowing strategies (the cases of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where, 
respectively, deficiencies in their macro and micro fundamentals were clearly revealed by the 
waves of speculative attacks against their currencies), or even to start one (the case of Romania). 
 
 
4.2  Examples of future developments of the linkage strategies 
From a full EMU participation point of view, i.e. for entry into the Euro area, any type of 
exchange rate linkage arrangement should be seen as a transitional one, which raises the 
question of the ￿exit strategy￿. Any such exit strategy has to be credible and sustainable, 
otherwise, the hard won stabilisation gains achieved can easily be lost. We will now briefly 
present two examples of country￿specific strategies (one for a CB-based system, the other for a 





Poland, among the countries with a fully fledged Central Bank, has one of the most clearly 
defined strategies for integrating into the Euro area of all current future entrants
59. The NBP in 
its ￿Medium Term Strategy of Monetary Policy 1999-2003￿ (see NBP, 1998, (b)) clearly states 
the middle-run aim of integrating the Zloty into the Euro area, in a process preceded by a 
progressive widening of the peg bands and the slowing down of the crawl rate (this phase would 
take place between 1997 and 1999), which should culminate in a temporary floating of the 
currency (perhaps already by early 2000, according to the latest statements of the NBP), with 
                                                 
57  Proposals have been made to introduce currency boards in other countries, like Poland (See Freytag, 1998). 
58  BØnassy-QuØrØ & LahrŁche-RØvil (see BØnassy-QuØrØ & LahrŁche-RØvil, 1998) tried to estimate optimal 
weightings for currency baskets￿ pegs for a set of Eastern European, countries taking trade flows and debt 
compositions into consideration. Their results indicate that the Euro should have a 85% weight in Bulgaria, 
89% weight in the Czech Republic, 91% in Hungary, 89% in Poland, 70% in Romania, 76% in Slovakia 
and 93% in Slovenia. 
 
59  Poland is also special in the sense that, being the biggest of all new entrants ￿as stated in Chapter I, its 
economy and population surpasses all the other likely ￿first wave￿ entrants taken together. It also has to 
face some of the most difficult reforms of the whole group: for example, the amazingly large share of its 
work force still in the primary sector (25%, with the proviso that actually only 10% have this sector as their 
main source of income),  and the still partial privatisation process of its economy. Due to this, it will 
probably be the most complicated integration case in the first wave. 
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the express objective of assessing the equilibrium value of the Zloty before its final fixing 
within the Euro framework. 
60 
 
This strategy explicitly provides for the abandoning of the peg strategy (due to the limitations 
described above) and its replacement with a strategy of direct inflation targeting
61 (or, more 
precisely, inflation forecast targeting) in the inter-twinning period
62. The NBP￿s medium-term 
monetary policy target will be set to reduce inflation to below 4% by the year 2003 (by which 
date, it assumes, Poland should enter the EU and also a ERM-2-like mechanism), finally 
joining the Euro area by 2005.  
 
The yearly inflationary target will be defined as a wide-band range, to give greater flexibility 






For the countries with a CBA-type of monetary authority, on the other hand, the Lithuanian 
case, described by some as a ￿currency board with exit strategy￿, is a particularly useful 
example
64.  
                                                 
60  Clearly, an assumption of this strategy is that in a floating exchange rate regime the exchange rate will move to 
its equilibrium value, something which some economist doubt. 
  
61  Some authors doubt that Poland is ready for the effective use of a DIT strategy (see Christoffersen & 
Wescott, 1999), due to the lack of stable relationships in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
and to the lack of reliable forecasting of the inflation target (once again, due to the lack of stable 
relationships among variables in an economy still in a transition process). 
62  The choice of a direct inflation targeting (DIT) strategy can be supported by the following arguments: 
•  The monetary policy goal is explicit and understood by all economic agents; 
•  DIT, by its openness, limits the ability of monetary authorities to implement short-term objectives in 
the real economy and it allows for public verification of monetary policy directions and the policy 
effectiveness, thereby enhancing the policy credibility, and, with this increased credibility, it allows 
for minimising the social cost of inflationary expectations; 
•  DIT allows for greater flexibility in applying monetary policy instruments, which enables the CB to 
tailor its actions to specific shocks; 
•  Contrary to a policy based on controlling aggregate money supply, DIT allows for more flexible 
reactions to changing velocity of money. 
 
63  The NBP￿s Council has decided to set the 1999 target in the range of 8% to 8.5%. 
 
64   It must be noted that some authors (see ˜im￿, K. 1998) have a much more negative interpretation of the 
monetary policy developments in Lithuania and the very institutional design of the Lithuanian monetary 
authority, linking them to, in essence, a power struggle within the Lithuanian government.  
 
  According to this interpretation, the institution of the CBA increased, in practical terms, the margin of 
manoeuvre of the government in terms of economic policy, due to the elimination of a competing centre of 
authority ￿the BoL- with increasing domestic standing: this is possible because, almost uniquely among 
CBAs, the exchange rate of the Litas can be changed by a mere government decision, albeit one made in 
consultation with the BoL (this has led some authors to question if the Lithuanian arrangement deserves to 
be called a CBA at all: see ˜im￿, ibid). Such a situation is actually the opposite of the expected outcome 
of a CBA.  
  
  Historically, the institution of the CBA was imposed upon the BoL by a government decision against the 
Bank￿s advise, after it had achieved the stabilisation of the Litas and without any real modifications of its 
internal structure. The high turnover of BoL￿s Governors ￿seven since its founding in 1990, two of them 
temporary ones- grants it the lowest score in actual independence among the Baltic monetary authorities, EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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The Bank of Lithuania (BoLi) has already started to implement some phased modifications to 
its CBA to enable it to pursue an active, CB-type monetary policy (see ￿arkinas, 1999). 
Currently, monetary policy in Lithuania is implemented under a modified currency board 
arrangement.  
 
CBAs are useful in that they provide a credible policy commitment, by means of hands-off 
monetary policy (which is, in practice, exogenous, since the adjustment process is automatic, 
and takes place through flows of the reserve currency).  
 
Nevertheless, among their several limitations, they discourage the development of domestic 
money and capital markets, strictly limit the ability of the monetary authority to act as a 
lender of last resort (LLR), and its capacity to perform active policy actions (which may be 
necessary in periods of market instability, as was clearly the case in Eastern Europe after last 
year￿s Russian crisis).  
 
The Lithuanian strategy to move towards a full-fledged CB was presented at the ￿Monetary 




st. Phase: Development and introduction of open market operations and a Lombard 
facility with the currency board still in existence (1997-1999); 
•  2
nd. Phase: Amendments to the ￿Law on the Credibility of the Litas￿ (1999-2000); 
•  3
rd. Phase: Reorientation of the exchange rate of the Litas to establish a closer 
relationship with the EU and the EMU (2000-onwards). 
 
Implementation of the first phase had already begun in 1997, when the Bank of Lithuania 
introduced open market operations on a limited basis. Such operations were designed to be 
consistent with the limits allowed by the ￿Law on the Credibility of the Litas￿, which 
regulates the operations of the Lithuanian monetary authority
65.  
 
The Bank of Lithuania has deliberately developed monetary instruments similar to those used 
by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) itself. These include: 
i)  a reserve ratio, currently set at 10 % of domestic and foreign currency bank liabilities 
under one year; 
ii)  some market-based monetary instruments, namely, ￿repos￿ to increase liquidity and 
deposit auctions to decrease it; 
                                                                                                                                                        
according to the ￿Cukierman￿ index. Some of them were dismissed due to direct conflicts with the 
Lithuanian government (most famously in 1993, when the then Governor refused to allow the use of the 
BoL profits to finance the government￿s budget; the following Governor, after an interim administration 
and already under the CBA legislation, even allowed the use of the BoL￿s reserves as collateral for loans 
provided by private banks to the government). 
 
65  Obviously, open market actions for macroeconomic aims are not directly applicable under a pure currency 
board arrangement. Nevertheless, they can be used to reduce short-term interest rates￿ volatility. They can 
also be used to help transmit changes in external rates to domestic markets, when institutional factors or 
imperfections prevent this from automatically taking place. 
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iii)  a Lombard facility; 
iv)  a LLR facility.  
 
During the second stage, the legal framework will be amended, to allow the use of direct 
discretionary monetary policy. Finally, during the third stage, policy will be oriented towards 
the integration of Lithuania into the EU. This final stage is not likely to begin before the year 
2000. At that point, the Bank of Lithuania plans to peg the Litas to a currency basket, made 
up of 50 % Euro and 50 % USD, and, later, to fully peg the Litas to the Euro (preserving the 
same current external value of the Litas). At that point, the BoL plans to be prepared to meet 






As we can see from the very brief descriptions above, the new entrants currently lack both a 
homogeneous or a stable approach concerning their linkages with the new currency. They also 
lack homogeneous institutional structures to manage this relationship and most also lack a clear 
strategy of integration. Those who do, see it as multiple stage, progressive process, which will 
enable the countries to adapt to these developments in a multi-year framework (a progressive, 
adaptive view that is shared by the EU itself).
67  
 
4.3  Getting ready for the Euro 
As we indicated above, the transitional linkage strategies and the degrees of preparation ￿ and, 
indeed, the very perception of the need to already start preparing - for an eventual integration 
into the Euro area varies widely from country to country. 
 
This necessarily will change, as the need to prepare for it becomes clear over the next few years. 
The European Commission, during the ongoing negotiation process, through the pre-
accession treaties, with the advice and technical support from the European Central 
Bank
68, will have to define a clear and gradual monetary integration strategy for these 
countries. Until then, their disparate, even informal linkages with the Euro area ￿ fixed and 
sliding pegs, managed floats, currency boards- shall remain. 
                                                 
66  Recently, the BoLi has resolved (see Statement of the Bank of Lithuania, October 13, 1999) not to carry out 
the planned re-peg of the Litas exchange rate, and to re-peg the Litas directly to the Euro in the second half 
of 2001, skipping an intermediate peg to a USD/Euro currency basket. The pegging of the Litas directly to 
the Euro is defended on the basis that ￿no principal decisions concerning the litas exchange rate will be 
taken in 1999-2000; therefore, in the future, this plan will have to be carried out faster￿. Additionally, such 
a peg would be more transparent and easily understood by the agents, and, at the same time, would send a 
clear signal to them to increase the use of the euro in their international settlements in trade with the 
European Union.  
 
67  Some statements (see Repse, 1998, (a) & (b)) seems to indicate that a few countries would be prepared to 
contemplate the immediate adoption of the Euro. Nevertheless, is doubtful that such statements can be 
actually taken seriously. 
 
68   There is a meeting scheduled to take place in Helsinky in mid-November, 1999, between the ECB and 
representatives of the monetary authorities of all Accession Countries. Understandably, the ECB which is 
only just functioning as an institution, has not yet played a important role in discussing present and future 
exchange rate linkage strategies with the accession countries. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Hopefully, all the applicant countries will, with time, converge to a common optimal strategy for 
their  progressive integration into the common currency monetary framework. These 
convergence strategies should, nevertheless, necessarily be specific to the individual 
countries national conditions. An example of such a successful progressive integration can be 
again taken from the experiences of a southern member of the Union (See Annex B on the 
experiences of Portugal). 
 
Such a strategy should perhaps be based on an early voluntary entry into an ERM2-like 
mechanism, as suggested in the Commission￿s ￿Composite Paper￿ (See EC, 1998, ibid), but 
that entry would be advisable only after the implementation of the necessary macro 
structural reforms - with adequate micro underpinnings - had been undertaken in a 
sustainable fashion; amongst these reforms, the most important are: 
i) the complete constitution of an independent and operational central bank; including no 
privileged financing for government; 
ii) the final and progressive opening up of these countries capital accounts; 
iii) the restructuring and adequate supervision of a privatised and liberalised financial system; 
iv) the full completion of the domestic price liberalisation process; 
v) an adequate level of labour market flexibility. 
 
Issues 1, 2, and to a lesser extent 3 and 4 will be dealt with in the negotiations on the Acquis 
Communautaire, as conditions for EU membership. All issues are discussed with the 
Commission in the framework of the Joint Assessments. 
 
The optimal path towards that stage should perhaps be similar to the Polish integration 
strategy, in which the currency linkage(s) evolve(s) towards increased flexibility, culminating 
in a temporary float regime before ERM2 entry
69. The major benefit of this approach would 
be that the currency has the opportunity to find its equilibrium level. This advice may indicate 
that CBA-type strategies should, in the medium term, be replaced by the applicant countries that 
use them, and attempts to develop fully fledged central banks should be undertaken, but without 
undermining the hard won stabilisation and credibility gains. 
 
The alternative to the ￿free float to find equilibrium￿ option would be a strategy of just 
continuing (or start in case of an existing float) the pegging arrangement with the Euro area with 
initially regular realignments. The peg would gradually be tightened (meaning fewer 
realignments) to prepare for ERM2 entry. In this way not the market, but the monetary 
authorities would try to find exchange rate equilibrium. To some extent also the real economy of 
the country pursuing this strategy would be pushed into the equilibrium by real adjustment. 
 
We will discuss the pros and cons of these two options in the next chapter. 
                                                 
69   For a ￿critique￿ of the Polish strategy, see footnote 65, pp. 50. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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5.  Economic and institutional consequences of EMU 
membership and its timing 
In this chapter we will discuss the pro￿s and cons of full EMU membership for the accession 
countries. The question whether benefits of joining a currency union for the accession 
countries outweigh costs will amongst others depend on traditional factors like the costs of 
losing the monetary policy instrument to counter economic shocks, the benefits of higher 
trade and investment flows, and the ￿free￿ monetary credibility provided by joining the union. 
The situation for the accession countries is even more complicated than that due to the 
transitional nature of their economies and the gap in income and productivity levels. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, in paragraph 5.1 we discuss the rationale for 
entering a currency area from a theoretical point of view. In 5.2 we go into the dangers of 
entering a currency union when ￿real convergence￿ has not taken place. We underline these 
dangers with an analysis of problems of the East German and Greek integration into 
monetary union with West Germany and with the Euro area, respectively. Finally, in 




5.1  The rationale for joining the Economic and Monetary Union 
In chapter 1 we have already mentioned that the theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA￿s) 
identifies a number of factors which determine if it is warranted to give up an independent 
national currency. The loss of the national currency increases the adjustment costs caused by 
exogenous economic shocks, while on the positive side the elimination of transaction costs and 
exchange rate risk generates economic growth via larger trade and investment flows. Moreover 
the risks and costs for small economies in carrying out independent monetary policy are 
eliminated. 
 
Research on the costs of giving up an independent currency has concentrated in trying to 
develop some quantifiable results, usually through the testing of effects of the so-called 
￿asymmetric shocks￿. This concept is originally linked to Mundell￿s definition of an OCA as a 
region, and of the related notion of adjustment costs that would have to be borne by that region 
to face any changes in the external environment. A region is defined, for the purpose of testing 
this hypothesis, as an area where the economic structure would be so similar as to react in a 
homogeneous fashion to any external shocks. Additionally, other criteria are usually also 
added to the testing procedure, like the degree of openness of an economy (measured by the 
ratio of trade to GDP), the degree of trade orientation towards the members of the existing 
currency union, the similarity in production structure, and the linkages in the financial flows 
sphere (has public debt been issued in the currency to be joined). These factors are all 
hypothesised to increase the benefits of entering a currency union. 
 
The usual conclusions of such estimations are that the United States is an OCA, due to the 
existence of factors like: 
i) a federal system of fiscal transfers, 
ii) a high degree of labour mobility, EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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iii) a high degree of economic integration 
iv) a diversified production structure  
 
These features would make coping with the costs of adjustment to exogenous shock bearable, 
thus rendering the use of the currency instrument unnecessary, while the EU, due to the lack of 
the first two features, would not be an OCA (not at the start of the process, at least)
70. 
 
The line of argument above tends to overly concentrate on the ￿minus￿ side of a single currency 
area (the increase in adjustment costs), without taking into consideration the likely benefits 
arising from its constitution: the elimination of transaction costs and exchange rate risk, and 
elimination of the costs of independent monetary policy. Thus a proper cost/benefit analysis is 
not carried out.  
 
Another set of studies tries to operationalise the estimation of the positive components, the most 
influential of which is the well-known European Commission study on the ￿Costs of Non 
Europe￿ (See European Commission, 1990). This study also presents estimates of the costs of 
EMU, but these losses are far out-weighted by the benefits arising from the constitution of the 
European common currency area.  
 
Nevertheless, most of the studies in this latter set lack the conceptual and modelisation 
consistency of the first group, usually resorting to a piecemeal estimation of several types of 
benefits (elimination of currency exchange risks, of interest rate differentials, positive impacts 
on trade and capital flows, etc.) arising from the lack of a single currency, and then adding them 
up. The common currency constitution is usually presented as a one shot measure to reap these 
gains. 
 
Given these two approaches, what can we say of the advantages of integration in the Euro area 
for the new member states? So far there are no specific studies as described above for the 
applicant countries. However, we can safely assume that they would indicate that the Euro area - 
itself not an OCA ￿ does not qualify as an OCA with the new entrants added to it
71.  
  
It should be noted that both approaches tend to ignore the costs of independent monetary policy. 
As the Asian Crisis has shown the balancing act between external and internal stability in an 
environment with substantial foreign capital flows can be very difficult for relatively small 
developing (and transition) economies. Membership of a currency union eliminates the need for 
accession countries to carry out this balancing act. Furthermore, investment in monetary policy 
credibility is no longer needed.  
 
As an approximation of the pattern of benefits (and costs) involved of joining the Euro area, we 
can hypothesise that this would be roughly similar to the ones estimated for the Southern 
                                                 
70  The United States itself actually only became a currency union about a generation after independence. This 
underlines a serious limitation of the OCA theory: its static feature. 
 
71  De Grauwe and Aksoy (See De Grauwe & Aksoy, 1999) arrive at the conclusion that the Eastern European 
Countries, as a group, might be an OCA with the EU. Nevertheless, their results are preliminary and 
tentative, and, as they themselves indicate, should be taken with care. Horvath and Jonas (See Horvath & 
Jonas, 1998), for the Czech Republic, in a country study, came to the conclusion that it is not, at this 
moment, an OCA with the EU. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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European economies
 72. For example, for Portugal entry into the Euro area was estimated to raise 
the level of GDP per capita, on a 10-year horizon, by only 1%.
73 (See MinistØrio das Finan￿as, 
1998). Such low gains were due to the assumption, on the alternative scenario used in that study, 
that Portugal would keep the same type of sustainable macro policies, regardless of the 
participation in the Euro area, and also due to the fact the main channel of transmission of real 
effects in that model used was the decrease of the interest rate
74 (much closer in Portugal to the 
average European level than in the current applicant countries). 
 
Given this comparison, the positive impact on Eastern European economies would probably be 
substantially greater than in the Portuguese case, since interest rate differentials with the EU are 
still substantially larger for the accession countries. Other channels of transmission that would 
have positive effects are as noted: the increase in trade flow, larger public financial transfers 
from the EU, more substantial private capital flows, and ￿free￿ monetary credibility.  
 
It should also be realised that the accession countries are in the process of diversifying their 
production structure (services are becoming much more important) and, furthermore, are 
reorienting their trade structure in the direction of the EU. This would make it less likely in the 
future that they would be affected by exogenous shocks differently then the EU itself. Clearly 
the reaction to the Russian crisis illustrates that presently exogenous shocks still affect the 
CEECs differently. Thus, the loss of the monetary policy instrument would presently involve 
costs. These can be expected to diminish greatly in the coming five to ten years. Many of the 
accession countries now already have 50-70 percent of their trade with the EU (see Table 5.1).  
                                                 
72  Buch (See Buch, C., 1999), in a study on financial integration which also uses the Southern European 
states as a benchmark for the new entrants, concludes that the benefits derived from EU accession will be 
smaller for the latter, since their degree of integration is already greater than the former in a similar stage, 
and will increase before the actual accession. This ￿convergence from outside￿ is actually one of the 
standard features of the successive expansion waves of the EU (See Vinhas de Souza, L., 1996). 
 
73  These results are obtained from the updating of the endogenous growth model developed by Gaspar and 
Pereira in 1995 (See Gaspar & Pereira, 1995). 
 
74  Since commercial integration and the benefits from private and public capital inflows were already a 
reality for Portugal, the effects of these other real channels of transmission were marginal in the outcome. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Bulgaria 34,2  32,5 37,2 35,1 37,7  45,0* 
Czech  Rep.  42,6 45,0 61,1 62,4 61,5 63,3 
Cyprus 41.6  55.5# 59.0 57.2 56.3  61.9* 
Estonia  23,3 23,9 66,0 64,6 59,2 60,1 
Hungary  40.1 45.3 61.5 62.3 62.8 64.1 
Latvia  17.1 24.9 49.9 49.2 53.2 55.3 
Lithuania  18.7 26.4 37.1 42.4 46.5 50.2 
Malta  71.0 75.7 72.7 68.5 70.2 69.3 
Poland  57.6 57.5 64.6 63.9 63.8 65.9 
Romania  45.3 45.7 50.5 52.3 52.5 57.7 
Slovakia  20.6 26.2 34.8 37.3 39.6 50.4 
Slovenia  46.2 57.1 68.8 67.5 67.4 69.4 
EXPORTS 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Bulgaria 29,9  35,4 37,6 39,1 43,2  49,7* 
Czech  Rep.  41,6 42,6 60,9 60,9 58,2 64,2 
Cyprus 42.6  52.2# 59.0 55.4 48.0  50.4* 
Estonia  17,8 19,0 54,0 51,0 48,6 55,1 
Hungary  46.5 51.0 62.8 69.7 71.2 72.9 
Latvia  24.4 27.9 44.0 44.7 48.9 56.6 
Lithuania  18.9 25.7 36.4 32.9 32.5 38.0 
Malta  71.0 74.0 71.4 56.9 54.3 52.8 
Poland  64.3 62.7 70.0 66.3 64.2 68.3 
Romania  41.3 48.2 54.1 56.6 56.6 64.5 
Slovakia  24.1 28.4 37.8 41.3 41.7 55.8 
Slovenia  42.6 59.2 67.0 64.6 63.6 65.5 
 
* January-September 1998 
Source:  European Commission, national sources. 
 
 
However, most of the beneficial effects mentioned would probably also happen if sustainable 
macro policies and the progress towards EU accession were maintained. They do not require 
full entry into EMU. It is therefore difficult to identify net effects, i.e. effects that are 
exclusively related to full participation in EMU. Nevertheless, the consensus opinion of the 
economic profession seems to be that full EMU participation will have net positive 
effects for first wave accession countries in the medium term.
75 The question, of course, is 
how long the medium term takes. 
 
 
                                                 
75  Some national modelizations (see Wdowinski, P. & van Aarle, B., 1998, for the case of Poland) would 
seem to agree with this conclusion. Of course, other -non-economic- considerations (political, strategic, 
security-related) also underpin the new entrants￿ will to integrate themselves with the EU. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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5.2  Progressive and sustainable convergence towards the Euro area 
In the previous discussion we have not mentioned one of the main reasons why a currency union 
may (initially) not be beneficial for the accession countries. As mentioned in paragraph 2.3 the 
Balassa-Samuelson-effect will induce a process of real appreciation of the currencies of these 
countries and also induce structurally higher levels of inflation than in the EU. Most of the 
academic literature suggests that a substantial amount of ￿real convergence￿ will have to take 
place before governments strive for monetary and fiscal convergence. The recognition that the 
convergence process will take time to be completed in a sustainable nature, has been the main 
reason why a progressive and phased strategy has been built into the legal and institutional 
structure of the EU accession process. 
 
A ￿real convergence￿ process ￿ broadly defined as a catching up in productivity and real 
GDP level - will, in most of the applicant countries, have two components. The first is related 
to the transition process from a command to a market economy. The second is related to the 
catching up process with more developed economies. Both will inevitable take time. 
 
As an indication of the likely period required for ￿real convergence￿ to take place, we already 
referred in paragraph 1.1.2 to an IMF study (see Fischer et al., 1998) which calculated the 
real convergence of the accession countries in cooperation with the level of the southern EU 
Member States. The conclusion of the paper is that ￿real convergence￿ will be a 
generation-long process, even under beneficial macro circumstances. 
 
The still large income and productivity differentials of the applicant countries when compared to 
the EU average, could result in very negative outcomes if a premature integration process is 
attempted, not only for the new member states, but for the for the EU ￿core￿ itself. Three 
scenarios may present themselves: 
 
 
5.2.1.  A ￿First Best￿ scenario 
 
The remaining productivity differential between accession countries and EU core is counteracted 
by high degrees of wage and labour flexibility. This means that wages remain below the wage 
levels of the EU core and only increase in line with productivity growth in the new member 
states. Any remaining pressures are resolved by work force migration towards the high 
productivity/high wage areas, speeding up the equalisation of the differentials. This is the natural 
economic adjustment process in a truly integrated economic region, like the US. Unfortunately, 
wage flexibility and labour mobility are not features of the EU or of the applicant countries 
themselves. Therefore this scenario is not particularly likely. 
 
 
5.2.2.  A ￿Second Best￿ scenario  
 
A high degree of wage flexibility counteracts the low degree of labour mobility in the catch up 
process. Alternatively, a high degree of labour mobility counteracts the wage rigidity, although 
large intra-Union migration flows are not a realistic alternative in the current EU environment. 
This process is supported by a limited degree of net fiscal transfers from the EU core, to cushion 
any remaining transition costs and to accelerate the reduction of the productivity differential. 
This is, roughly speaking, the scenario applicable to the EU￿s southern member states. 
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5.2.3.   ￿Third Best￿ scenario  
 
Lack of either wage flexibility or labour mobility leads to the build up of inflationary 
pressures, an increase of unit labour cost and a consequent loss of competitiveness and flight 
of investment towards the high productivity EU core. Massive social and economic unrest 
can only be counteracted by very substantial financial transfers. These transfers can be very 
persistent as well because by themselves they do not necessarily eliminate the distortions that 
perpetuate the productivity differential. This scenario is clearly demonstrated by the Italian 
Mezzogiorno or the former East Germany (see Annex C). 
 
The applicant countries themselves are acutely aware of these potential problems: they know 
that the EU itself is not yet an OCA, and that it will not immediately become one with the new 
Member Countries in it. The potential of asymmetric shocks (i.e., changes in the external 
economic environment that affect differently distinct parts of a common currency area) 
affecting the EU, without the adjustment mechanism of national exchange rates, and 
insufficient labour mobility, wage flexibility and limited scope for compensating fiscal 
transfers, is substantial. 
 
Additionally, besides economic convergence, time will also be necessary for institution 
building and the sheer learning process of how to use policy instruments (including, of 
course, the monetary instruments necessary for the participation in the ESCB) in the applicant 
countries. 
 
The dangers of early entry into a currency union are further illustrated by the East German 
and by the Greek example. In Annex C we describe the economic impact of the monetary 
unification of the former East and West Germany. In Box IV we go into the unsuccessful real 
convergence of Greece. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 



































5.3  Accession country strategies for full EMU membership 
As discussed in Chapter One, the position among the ￿first wave countries￿ concerning EU 
accession timeframe seems to be relatively homogeneous. According to the EC (see EC, 
1998) for the ￿first wave￿ countries future EU accession is ￿￿based on the working 
hypothesis that they would join the European Union on 1 January 2002 in the case of 
Hungary and on 1 January 2003 for the others￿. Nevertheless, the current more likely 
timeframe, according to Commission and independent sources, seems to be 2004-2006. 
 
The accession time frame presented above is the best case scenario. Informally, a number of 
countries have added a two-year margin of error for meeting the EU accession deadline. The 
timeframe suggested by the accession countries clearly indicates, however, the preference for 
a progressive and phased convergence, first to the EU and, for most countries in any case, 
 
Box 4: The Greek Case: Divergence within the EU 
 
Contrary to the case of the Iberian countries (Portugal and Spain: their successful partial
convergence is identified with a structural convergence towards the EU core average
productive basis, see L￿hnig, 1999) and of Ireland, among the less developed countries
that benefited from large EU inflows after accession ￿which will also benefit the future 
member countries, in the framework of structural funds used to help a catching up process
of development towards the EU core (the so called ￿real convergence￿), the Greek
Republic stands out as the single case of failure of progressive convergence towards the
EU average welfare levels. More than that, divergence (i.e., reduction of the national 
welfare level compared to the EU￿s) actually occurred, and that in spite of some of the
largest financial transfers in terms of GDP share (up to 5% of the Greek GDP, by the early
1990, below only the transfer to Ireland). 
 
The reason for that is the pursuing of inadequate and unsustainable macro policies: the 
first PASOK (Pan Hellenic Socialist Party) government in Greece in the early 1980￿s 
engaged in an budgetary expansion, which ultimately replaced (and reduced) domestic
savings and investment by external official EU transfers, which were used not to finance 
investment but consumption and the expansion of the Greek state (FDI was not promoted, 
and the Greek state actually expanded its share of the economy from 9% before accession
to 23% by the mid-1980￿s: see Orlowski, 1999). The expansionary fiscal policy was
accommodated by a lax monetary policy by the Greek Central Bank. Domestic reforms to 
improve economic efficiency (deregulation, opening up to foreign investment,
privatization) came to a halt. 
 
As a result of that, the Greek Drachma never entered the ERM-1, the country was 
excluded from Euro participation for flunking all the Convergence Criteria, and only
admitted in the ERM 2 in 1998.  
 
This should be seen as a warning for all the application countries: reform and 
convergence should be pursued before and after accession, in a consistent and
sustainable fashion. 
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only afterwards to the Euro area. Integration into the Euro area is more controversial and - 
rightly - perceived to be farther away.  
 
On a final balance of the costs and benefits of Euro participation for the applicant countries, 
most of the available EC opinions see it as a positive development, due to the reduction in 
transaction costs that it would bring to trade, to the reduction of currency risks and of 
financing costs, but these positive elements are only attainable on a long term perspective 
(see, among others, Avramov, 1999, Backe & Radzyner, 1998, Horvath & Jonas, 1998, 
Janackova, 1998, Nemenyi, 1998, Nissinen, 1999, Polanski, 1997 & 1999). 
 
Few clearly formulated positions are available on this subject from the accession countries. 
Nevertheless, of those few stated national positions that are accessible, almost all indicate the 




5.3.1.  ￿First Wave ￿ Countries 
 
Czech Republic  
The Czech Government published in 1998 its general strategy for EU accession (See Czech 
Republic, 1998). No specific time-frame is defined for full EMU participation, and the 
document argues that the country could join the Euro area from the starting point of any 
exchange rate regime (a statement which is not true given the EU￿s legal framework). This can 
only be interpreted as a side effect from the collapse of the Czech peg in 1997 and the policy 
insecurity still associated with the current ￿dirty floating￿ arrangement.  
 
Any Euro peg is seen as conditional upon achieving sustainable internal economic stability, 
defined as internal (fiscal) and external (current account) equilibrium and on progress on 
disinflation and wage growth restraint (see also Janackova, 1998). An informal Euro shadowing 
to replace the current DEM one is an achievable alternative in the longer run, but the 
independence of the domestic monetary policy for the foreseeable future is advocated. This 
eventual Koruna peg is seen as an alternative only in a 5-10 years horizon (see Horvath & Jonas, 
1998). Conforming to that opinion, in a recent interview, Pavel Mertlik, Czech Finance Minister, 
said that ￿regarding the EMU criteria, it seems probable that it will be a process of at least four 
to five years" (see Reuters, 25 of October, 1999). 
 
Estonia 
Estonia￿s CBA (currency board arrangement) ￿remains the cornerstone of economic policy, 
providing a transparent and credible framework for economic development￿ (see 
Lehmussaari, 1999). In January 1999, the Kroon￿s peg to the DEM became a de facto link to 
the Euro. In co-operation with the EU institutions, the Bank of Estonia (BoE) plans to have a 
medium term plan for joining the European Monetary System and, eventually, the common 
currency area by end-1999. According to the BoE, ￿the currency board provides a sound 
monetary policy framework for the preparation for the adoption of the Euro, and also 
provides the right signals for the real economy during the pre-Euro period￿ (see Lehmussaari, 
ibid).  
 
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar said in a radio interview (ETA, 18 of October, 1999) that 
￿Estonia should adopt the Euro right after EU membership￿. The Estonian government has EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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targeted 2003 as the year Estonia should be in the EU, but no official standpoint has been 
taken on EMU. Estonia’s Finance Minister Siim Kallas said, also on a recent interview, that 
￿Estonia is basically ready for EMU accession but it will have to muster the domestic political 
support needed for monetary union￿ (see Reuters, 25 of October, 1999). 
 
Hungary  
The Hungarian authorities started discussing the subject of integrating the Forint into EMU a 
few years ago. EU accession (as indicated above) would happen between 2002 and 2003, and 
joining the Euro area is envisaged as happening somewhere between 2005 and 2007 (see Backe 
& Radzyner, 1998).  
 
There seemed to be a consensus concerning a later entry into EMU and to ERM2 participation: 
￿￿we cannot see rationales of an early joining of the ERM2. Entering the ERM2 would limit 
the room of manoeuvre of Hungarian monetary policy ￿the earliest date for making an 
exchange rate commitment will be determined jointly by the disinflation record and the growth 
performance of the country￿ (see Nemenyi, 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, according to Hungarian Finance Minister Zsigmond Jarai￿s recent statements, 
￿Hungary is trying to prepare itself for joining EMU in the middle of the next decade, some two 
to three years after joining the EU (see Reuters, 25 of October, 1999). Jarai also said that 
￿Hungary might even fix the Forint to the Euro after 2001, bringing down inflation to between 
four and five percent by then, and introduce the Euro as its official currency as soon as 2004￿ 
(see Reuters, 2 of November, 1999). This should be preceded by a cut in the Forint’s crawling 




As indicated in the previous chapter, the Polish Republic had one of the most clearly defined 
strategies of integration into the Euro area of all entrants. The NBP in its ￿Medium Term 
Strategy of Monetary Policy 1999-2003￿ (see NBP, 1998, (b)) clearly states the medium term 
aim of integrating the Zloty into the Euro area. Envisaged is a process of progressive widening 
of the currency peg bands and the slowing down of the crawling peg (this phase would take 
place between 1997 and 1999), culminating in a temporary floating of the currency (perhaps 
already by early 2000, according to the latest statements of the NBP), with the express objective 
of assessing the equilibrium value of the Zloty before its final fixing within the Euro framework, 
and finally integrating into the Euro area by 2005. More recently, Polish Central Bank 
Governor Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz stated that ￿the country hoped to join EMU about three 
years after it enters the EU￿. Poland’s government also said that ￿it will be ready for 




Slovenia￿s position concerning Euro area integration seems more heterogeneous (some 
authorities even briefly indicated the country￿s willingness to join the Euro before joining the 
EU). After EU accession by 2002, domestic scenarios vary from a simultaneous entry into EU 
and EMU (in a statement by the prime minister), to 2005 (as stated by the Slovenian government 
in its NPAA), to 2008 (by the Minister of Economic Affairs), and, finally, to a non-committal 
(and perhaps more realistic) position from the Central Bank: it will join the EMU ￿when the 
country will have achieved sustainable macroeconomic stability￿. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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In the negotiations with the EU, Slovenia asked for an exemption from the ERM Criteria: the 
country specifically requested that the Tolar stability, in line with ERM2 requirements, should 
be considered as corresponding to a formal compliance with it.  
 
Slovenia is the only application country to have done so openly
76 so far (see Lavrac, V., 1999
77). 
The actual path towards such a monetary integration is, nevertheless, still an open question for 
the country￿s government. 
 
Recently, Slovenian Minister for European Affairs Igor Bavcar told reporters that "following 
(the publication of) the report (of 13 October)... we have every reason to believe that Slovenia 
will fulfil its plan to meet all membership criteria by the end of 2002" (see Reuters, 18 of 
October, 1999). Slovenia’s Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari said in a recent interview that ￿his 
country could be ready to enter EMU within the next two to three years, with inflation expected 
to go below six percent next year, while the budget deficit is seen below one percent of GDP￿ 
(see Reuters, 25 October, 1999). 
 
 
5.3.2.  ￿Second Wave ￿ Countries 
 
Bulgaria 
There is no real discussion in Bulgaria about abandoning the recent and fragile stability 
achieved in the country under a IMF-sponsored CBA for another type of currency or 
monetary arrangement. The anchor currency was shifted automatically from the DEM to the 
Euro on January 1, 1999, but the nearest thing available to a monetary integration strategy 
seems to indicate the aim of maintaining the CBA until EU accession, declare EMU 
participation as an aim afterwards, and, once inside the Union, to use the EU￿s own 
                                                 
76  Other requests of derogations by the applicant countries in 1998 were (see EC, 1998): ￿Poland, Hungary 
and Cyprus requested transitional periods beyond their working hypotheses in the area of 
Telecommunications. Hungary asked for a transitional period till 31 December 2002 for the full 
liberalisation of public networks voice telephony. Poland sought a transitional period of yet undetermined 
length for full access to certain frequency bands for mobile communications. Cyprus requested a 
transitional period till 31 December 2003 for the full liberalisation of the telecommunications market and 
the establishment of its national regulatory body. Under Industrial policy, Hungary requested a 6-month 
transitional period till 31 July 2002 for the European Coal and Steel Acquis until the expiry of the ECSC 
Treaty. Under the Audio-visual chapter, Slovenia sought a two-year transitional period for fully 
implementing the television without frontiers directives and the Czech Republic requested a transitional 
arrangement until 2005 for pay and cable television￿.  
 
In the 1999 Composite paper, the Commission seems to have taken a stronger stance, and draws a 
distinction between derogation and a transition period, the later being only acceptable in exceptional cases 
(like EMU), and the former, under specific circumstances: ￿Now that negotiations are underway the 
Commission considers that the EU should define its policy on transition periods more explicitly ￿ Any 
transition periods should therefore be few and short. For those areas of the acquis where considerable 
adaptations are necessary and which require substantial effort, including important financial outlays (in 
areas such as environment, energy, infrastructure), transition arrangements could be spread over a definite 
period of time provided candidates can demonstrate that alignment is underway and that they are 
committed to detailed and realistic plans for alignment, including the necessary investments￿ (see EC, 
1999(a)). 
 
77  The same Author makes one of the very few defences of an immediate EMU entry after EU accession, on 
the basis that this would reduce instability and the leaning period. Also, he has co-edited a collection of 
papers with de Grauwe, P. (see de Grauwe & Aksoy, 1999) in which the notion that Slovenia and the EU 
do conform to the OCA criteria is defended. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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framework for participation, including the timeframe. At that moment, the CBA ￿exit 
strategy￿ would be fixed, but the questions concerning the need to develop or not a full 
fledged CB seem not to be clear yet in the Bulgarian authorities￿ minds (see Avramov, 1999). 
 
Latvia  
Statements by the Latvian Foreign Minister in mid-October put Latvia￿s likely EU date of 
entry at 2005 (Reuters, 13 October, 1999). Additionally, some recent statements made by the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Latvia (see Repse, E., Governor, Bank of Latvia, General 
Economic Developments and Banking in Latvia, Notes, 29 of October 1999) indicate that the 
BoLa sees the fulfilment of Maastricht convergence criteria as a medium-term target, and 
￿will be able to meet all of them in 4 to 5 years￿. Also, he stated that ￿since the Lats has been 
pegged to the SDR at a constant exchange rate since 1994￿in principle, we are meeting the 
currency stability criteria￿. During the pre-accession period, the current peg of the Lats to the 
SDR shall, in principle, be maintained.  
 
Lithuania 
Through the Bank of Lithuania (BoLi), Lithuania, has already started to implement some 
phased modifications to its CBA to enable it to pursue an active, CB-type monetary policy 
(see ￿arkinas, 1999). Currently, monetary policy in Lithuania is implemented under a 
modified CBA.  
 
The Lithuanian strategy to move towards a fully fledged CB was presented at the ￿Monetary 
Policy Programme for 1997-1999￿, adopted by the Bank of Lithuania in 1997. It has three 
phases: 
•  First Phase: The development and introduction of open market operations and a 
Lombard facility with the currency board still in existence (1997-1999); 
•  Second Phase: The adoption of amendments to the ￿Law on the Credibility of the Litas￿ 
(1999-2000); 
•  Third Phase: The reorientation of the exchange rate of the Litas to establish a closer 
relationship with the EU and the EMU (2000-onwards). 
 
Recently, the BoLi has partially modified the timetable described above (see Statement of the 
Bank of Lithuania, October 13, 1999). It has resolved:  
a)  not to carry out the planned re-peg of the Litas exchange rate towards the Euro in 2000;  
b) to re-peg the Litas directly to the Euro in the second half of 2001, skipping an 
intermediate peg to a USD/Euro currency basket.  
 
The pegging of the Litas directly to the Euro is defended on the basis that ￿no principal 
decisions concerning the Litas exchange rate will be taken in 1999-2000; therefore, in the 
future, this plan will have to be carried out faster￿. Additionally, such a peg would be more 
transparent and easily understood by the agents, and, at the same time, would send a clear 
signal to them to increase the use of the Euro in their international settlements in trade with 
the European Union. 
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Slovakia  
There are very few clear positions concerning the evolution of the currency strategy of the 
Slovak Republic, but in a recent statement, the country’s Vice-Prime Minister, Pavel Hamzik, 
said that ￿the Slovak government expects to belong to the first wave of new member states 
joining the European Union in 2004￿. Also, Slovak Finance Minister Brigita Schmognerova 
said that "We suppose that we will enter ERM 2, which means the national bank would 
change from a floating to a fixed exchange rate, starting with a wide band and then narrowing 
it" (Reuters, 25 of October, 1999). 
 
As we can see from the very brief descriptions above (summarised in Table 5.2, next page), the 
few future member countries who do have a clear time table for joining the Euro (not 
surprisingly, most of these are former ￿first wave￿ countries) see it as a multiple stage, 
progressive process, which will happen after the EU entry, a view broadly in accordance with 
the EU￿s own accession strategy. Some of the former ￿second wave￿ countries are beginning to 
sketch tentatively their strategies (Lithuania is an exception, with a clear integration framework), 
but the majority also seem to agree with the phased approach. 
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Real wage flexibility and cross border labour mobility are neither features of the EU nor of 
the application countries: to increase both of them is a necessary long term policy goal, to 
improve allocation efficiency, and, consequently, average welfare and growth potential for 
the whole of the Union. Nevertheless, the current and foreseeable absence of these features 
means that the absorption of real shocks, without the availability of an exchange rate 
instrument, could place undue strain on the limited available fiscal adjustment instruments, 
and could imply a higher than necessary variability of GDP level, with all the associated 
negative social costs. 
 
Additionally, to spend political capital in an attempt prematurely to integrate in the common 
currency area could well divert the attention of the governments of the application countries 
from the more fundamental tasks of reform and convergence towards EU accession, and even 
compromise it. 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, there are powerful economic reasons to support a 
progressive and phased process of joining the Euro area after EU accession
78. This is also in 
                                                 
78  Of course, if an applicant country that has actually converged enough and in a sustainable manner (sic) to 
the EU core were to be ￿kept in the cold￿ ￿ i.e., out of the Euro zone - for mere legalistic reasons, that EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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accordance with the time frame laid out by the European Commission itself, and by the 
relatively few national governments of the applicant countries that have already begun seriously 
to consider the possibility and effect of EMU participation. The negative consequences of a 
premature monetary integration is exemplified by the East German case and should be taken into 
serious consideration by all actors involved in this process. 
                                                                                                                                                        
would be, in practical terms, disincentive to reform, since a set of successful and doubtlessly costly efforts 
would be not rewarded. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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6.   The external impact of an expanding Euro area 
6.1 Introduction 
With the start of the third phase of the European Economic and Monetary Union on January 
1, 1999, eleven European countries have decided to rely on the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to set monetary policy, and gradually adopt the Euro as their common currency. The 
current discussion in economic circles on the EMU has focused largely on the implications 
for EU countries (IMF, 1997a), both for the 11 participants and those expected to join later. 
However, the EMU and Euro do not only have implications for the EU countries, but also 
have potentially large effects on the international monetary system and on third countries, 
outside the European Union. 
 
In this chapter we will describe the impact of the establishment of the EMU and the foreseen 
implications of its enlargements on or to the 12 candidate countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Cyprus and Malta. We will see that the impact of enlargement on the 
international monetary system and on third countries largely depends on the success of the 
EMU itself. 
  
Paragraph 6.2.1 discusses the present situation with respect to the role of international 
currencies in the international monetary system and the global financial markets. Paragraph 
6.2.2 deals with the expected impact of the EMU on the international monetary system. These 
global effects will depend on the extent to which the Euro will be used in international 
transactions and the external spillovers from its effects on economic policy and performance 
in Europe. Paragraph 6.2.3 examines the economic significance of having an international 
currency. Paragraph 6.3 focuses on the impact of the envisaged enlargement on the EMU. 
Finally, paragraph 6.4 will discuss the implications of the EMU for non-participants. We will 
deal with the three most important groups of outsiders after the enlargement, the non-
participating Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (notably Russia and the 
Ukraine), the countries of the CFA franc zone and the Mediterranean countries. 
 
 
6.2  Impact on the role of the Euro as international currency 
6.2.1  Determinants of an international currency  
 
Two fundamentals seem to determine the main use of a currency in foreign exchange 
transactions: its importance in international trade in commodities and in securities. Both are 
related to the size of a country￿s domestic economy. The use of a currency beyond these 
fundamentals is determined by its role as a vehicle currency to mediate in exchanges between 
other currencies. Derived from the fundamentals of an international currency is the pegging 
of other currencies and the holding of official reserves. The dominance of a currency in 
foreign exchange transactions on the one hand, and the denomination of international assets 
and trade flows, currency pegging and official reserves holdings on the other, clearly 
reinforce each other. 
 
This paragraph examines the present situation with respect to the two fundamentals and the 
vehicle role of the current make-up of the international monetary system. We will first EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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discuss the foreign exchange market itself. Then we will examine the fundamentals that 
determine the role of a currency in the international monetary system. We will further focus 
on its use as vehicle currency, its role as a peg for other currencies and its function as official 
reserves.  
 
Role on the foreign exchange market 
The volumes of foreign currency exchanged on the foreign exchange markets are enormous: 
in April 1998, the average daily foreign exchange turnover was estimated at USD 1.4 trillion. 
The currency composition of these exchanges gives an indication about the key currencies 
traded in the world. The US dollar is by far the dominant currency and is currently used in 
87% of two-way transactions.
79 The Deutsch Mark follows at a respectable distance and is 
used in 30% of transactions. The third largest is the Japanese yen, which is used in 21% of 
transactions. All other currencies are used much less frequently. The best of the rest is the 
British pound, which is used in 11% of the transaction followed by the French franc with 5%. 
The other EU currencies (including the ECU) combined are used in 17% of transactions.
80 A 
simplified view of the world monetary system would thus only need to consider three 
currencies: the US dollar, the yen and the Euro with its legacy currencies and with the British 
pound. 
 
Importance for international trade in commodities  
The first fundamental is related to the denomination of the trade flows. Table 6.1 indicates 
that the US accounts for 12% of world exports, Germany for 9% and Japan for 8%. The share 
of the Euro area as a whole is with 17% much larger than that of the US or Japan. This is 
even more so for the EU.
81 In addition, the US and the EU both account for about 28% of 
total world output. Germany by itself, however, accounts for only 7%. The Euro area 
accounts for 22% of world output. Judging from these numbers, the use of the dollar, the yen 
as well as the Deutsch Mark in foreign exchange transactions (87%, 21% and 30%, 
respectively) overstates the importance of these countries in the world economy and trade. 
Based on the Euro area trade flows alone, the Euro should surpass the dollar in importance. 
 
European firms invoice a very large proportion of their exports in their own currencies. 
However, a significant proportion of European imports is invoiced in US dollars. Japanese 
firms, on the other hand, invoice mainly in dollars and the same applies overwhelmingly for 
developing countries. Although the share of Japanese exports invoiced in dollars has been 
falling and the share of US trade invoiced in foreign currencies is rising, nearly half of the 
world exports are invoiced in US dollars. The combined European currencies account for a 
share of about one third, with half of this for the D-mark. Invoicing in yen occurs in only 5% 
of the cases. 
 
 
                                                 
79   We are referring to two-way transactions implying that the breakdown percentages do not add up to 100%, 
but to 200%. This implies that other currencies besides the ones mentioned are used in 29% of 
transactions. 
 
80   These figures refer to reported daily average foreign exchange turnover in April 1998 net of local and 
cross-border inter-dealer double counting as reported in BIS (1999). The transactions include the foreign 
exchange spot market, the outright forwards market and the foreign exchange swaps. All transactions are 
reported in US dollars. 
 
81   This excludes intra-Euro area trade but includes trade with other EU members. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Table 6.1 Fundamentals of currency use 
 
  GDP  Exports Outstanding amount of 
international debt securities
￿
Outstanding amount of 
domestic debt securities
￿ 





    
  1997  1997 End 1998 end 1998 end 1998 end 1998 
  bn USD  Bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD 
    
World 28977  5528 4316 4316 17525 11221 
    
US 8083  688 845 1972 7807 5946 
Japan 4193  421 318 488 3746 1434 
    
Germany 2103  511 509 441 867 1138 
France 1394  290 266 222 743 484 
UK 1288  279 362 342 469 388 
Italy 1145  238 115 138 1216 364 
    
Euro area*  6289  934 1381 1174 3783 2330 
EU* 8096  920 1897 1542 4584 2944 
    
Poland** 135  26 4 1 29 0 
Czech Republic** 52  23 2 2 18 5 
Hungary** 45  19 13 - 15 1 
 
￿  International debt securities consist of domestically held debt instruments in domestic and foreign currency issued by 
non-residents and debt instruments in foreign currency issued by residents. Domestic debt securities consist of 
domestically held debt instruments issued by residents in domestic currency. 
*  Exports exclude intra-regional trade. Intra-regional international debt holdings are included with the international 
debt securities. 
**  Poland: 54% of exports to Euro area; Czech Republic: 55% of exports to Euro area; Hungary: 66% of exports to Euro 
area. 
Source:  BIS, IMF, World Bank, ECB. 
 
 
Importance for international trade in securities  
The second fundamental determinant of use as an international currency concerns cross-
border flows of securities. These flows generate a much larger volume of foreign exchange 
transactions than commodity trade. Table 6.1 reports the outstanding amounts of international 
debt securities (i.e. stocks), both by country of issue and by currency of issue.
82 Although the 
share of the US in international debt securities is ￿only￿ 20%, the share of the US dollar 
denominated debt is considerably larger at 46%. The Euro area nationality share of 
international debt is 32%, but its currency share is only 27%, implying that part of 
international Euro area debt securities have been issued in other currencies, most likely the 
US dollar. 
 
Assuming that security flows are more or less proportional to stocks, it is clear that the US 
dollar has a very dominant role in these flows.
83 Table 6.1 indicates that the use of the Euro 
for denomination of international debt securities by Euro area countries will make the Euro 
an important counterpart to the dollar. Moreover, it is likely that the Euro area countries will 
                                                 
82   Debt securities account for the largest portion of cross-border security flows by far. 
 
83   Portes and Rey (1998) present some evidence that the ratio of market turnover to outstanding stocks is 
higher for US securities than for European securities. Extrapolating this to the international markets, it 
implies that cross-border flows are even more pronouncedly biased towards US securities than suggested 
by the outstanding amounts. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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phase out the use of other currencies for the issue of new international debt securities. This 
should gradually further raise the share of the Euro in international debt issues. 
 
Vehicle currency 
The role of a currency as vehicle currency is crucial as it establishes the international status of 
the currency determined by its use beyond its fundamentals. The main determinant for a 
currency to be able to operate as a vehicle currency are transaction costs (Portes and Rey, 
1998). This concerns not only the transaction costs on the foreign exchange market but also 
the cost of transaction on the debt securities markets, especially the long-run government 
bond markets. The role of the latter arises when a customer has an open spot or future 
position in foreign currency. Just holding this foreign currency as cash implies interest loss. 
Hence, the foreign currency position is held in interest bearing securities. To curb risk on 
such an open position use is made of low-risk long run government bonds. Hedging against 
exchange rate risk is also an important source for the use of international bonds. 
 
Transaction costs on any financial market depend, among other things, on the market 
turnover, or the market￿s ￿thickness,￿ ￿liquidity￿ or ￿depth￿. This relation is a negative one 
and implies that the larger trading turnover is, the lower the transaction costs will be. 
Furthermore, the lower transaction cost, the more dealers will make use of that market thus 
raising turnover and further lowering transaction cost. This is called the market thickness 
externality, which constitutes a strong perpetuating mechanism of established trading 
patterns. 
 
In 1998, transaction costs on foreign exchange markets were the lowest for DM-dollar 
exchange. Transaction costs for the yen-dollar are 2% higher. For the DM-yen transaction 
costs are almost 8% higher. These differences are significant but not alarming and will, by 
themselves, not result in spot exchanges using vehicle currencies. On the bond markets, 
however, major differences in transaction costs between the US, Germany and Japan exist. 
On the US government bond markets transaction costs are lowest. Transaction costs on the 
Japanese government bond market are 124% higher. On the German bond market transaction 
costs are even 156% higher than on the US government bond market. This pattern of 
transaction costs fits the relative size of the government bond markets as measured by 
outstanding debt as reported in Table 6.1. 
 
In conclusion, the observed differences in transaction costs for bond markets constitute 
a major reason for the use of the US dollar as a vehicle currency. It is this feature that 
has played an important role in the establishment and perpetuation of the US dollar as 
the main international currency in the last decades. 
 
Currency pegging 
Currency pegging is both cause and effect of a reputation as international currency, but is 
frequently also dictated by international politics. Dollar domination is also illustrated in the 
number of countries pegging their currency, formally announced or de facto. As of March 
1998, of the 182 IMF member countries, 47 had formally pegged their currency against a 
single other currency. Of these, 20 did so against the US dollar and 15 against the French 
franc (see IMF, 1998).  
 
All these 47 countries with a formal peg are relatively small or very small, with Argentina as 
the major exception. Even jointly, these countries do not represent a significant share of the EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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world economy. In the 1990s, some CEECs, like Bulgaria and Estonia, have pegged their 
currencies to the Deutsch Mark, or to a basket in which the Deutsch Mark has a large weight 
(see chapter 5). 
 
A number of more important countries such as the People￿s Republic of China and a number 
of Southeast Asian countries have a de facto arrangement with the US dollar under a formally 
announced policy of managed or independent floating. The international financial crises in 
the emerging markets in 1997, however, have forced some of these countries to adopt a more 
flexible exchange arrangement, thus weakening dollar domination.  
 
In short, the US dollar has until now been a much more popular anchor for currency 




Holdings of official reserves and currency pegging by governments are also affected by the 
established patterns in the international money markets. The share of the US dollar in official 
reserves is much higher than the share of any other single currency. Although declining, the 
dollar share in official reserves stood at 53% in 1995. The corresponding shares of the 
Deutsch Mark and the yen stood at 13% and 6%, respectively. 
 
Overall Conclusion 
The US dollar has a dominant role in foreign exchange transactions, in trade and 
security flows and as vehicle currency. This role is likely to remain in the coming 
decade. Its status of international currency will not change soon, as inertia is a powerful 
force in international finance (Bergsten, 1997b). 
 
 
6.2.2  The impact of the EMU on the international monetary system 
 
The creation of the EMU has already had and will have in the future important implications 
for the global financial markets and the international monetary system. This impact can to a 
large extent also be equated to the Euro￿s prospective significance as an international 
currency.  
 
The future role of the Euro, however, depends on several interrelated factors, such as the 
future strength and the relative stability of the currency, and the integration of the capital 
markets in the countries of the Euro area.  
 
Future strength of the Euro 
An important factor for the strength of the Euro is how strictly or liberally the Maastricht 
Treaty will be interpreted. If the countries of the Euro area will manage to establish and 
maintain fiscal discipline and keep inflation low, as has been agreed in the Stability and 
Growth Pact, then the Euro will establish a track record and win credibility on the markets.  
 
The strength of the Euro can also be approached on a relative basis: will the relevant 
authority of the EMU promote a relatively high or low value of the Euro against the US 
dollar? In each country or currency block there is always some balancing between the EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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benefits of a relatively strong currency with low inflation, and a relatively weak currency 
promoting employment (see Polak, 1997).  
 
Exchange rate stability 
Exchange rate stability of the Euro would also contribute to the attractiveness of the Euro as 
an international currency. A major international concern regarding the EMU is the anticipated 
increased exchange rate volatility between the world’s most important currencies, the dollar 
and the Euro. Large swings in the major currencies would affect the terms of trade and the 
competitiveness. Two reasons are mentioned in the literature for the anticipated increased 
exchange rate volatility.  
 
Firstly, there is the diminishing scope for international exchange co-ordination. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) is employing a price stability target. Hence, it is probably bothering less 
with exchange rate volatility or the external value of the Euro. Before the establishment of the 
EMU, the individual countries of the Euro area were much more open economies (in terms of 
export-GDP ratios) and hence more concerned about their exchange rates vis-￿-vis their 
neighbours. The Euro area as a whole is a large, closed economy, rather like the United 
States, with a value of exports outside the EU block only slightly above 10% of its GDP (see 
Cohen, 1997). Due to such a benign neglect in the Euro area, the exchange rate volatility 
between the world￿s most important currencies, US dollar, the Euro and also the Japanese yen 
might increase.  
 
Second, larger swings in exchange rates are expected from changes in interest differentials 
between the dollar and the Euro, as the Euro emerges as a major international currency. 
Under these conditions, investors are able to arbitrage much more freely between Euro- and 
dollar assets if both markets are deep and broad (Portes, 1999). 
 
The anticipated exchange rate volatility could be detrimental for the future role of the Euro as 
international currency. Nevertheless, more volatility between the Euro and the US dollar is 
also bad for the US dollar.  
 
Capital market integration 
The extent and timing of future role of the Euro as international currency depends also on the 
ability of Europe to forge a single Europe-wide integrated capital and financial market 
(Bergsten, 1997a). McCauly and White (1997) argue that exchange rate uncertainty was in 
the past the main reason for capital market segmentation in Europe. Hence, the emergence of 
the Euro is boosting the integration of capital markets, which will lower the costs of financial 
transactions, narrow interest rate spreads and expand the supply of Euro-denominated assets. 
Portes and Rey (1998) argue that the reduction of transaction costs in an integrated pan Euro 
financial market allows the Euro to take over the role of the dollar in European-Japanese 
trade. Increased competition on the European financial markets and increasing financial 




In the academic world, the commonly held opinion is that the Euro should be able to 
become a much more important international currency, as a medium of exchange and a 
store of value. The larger economic base of the Euro and the elimination of transaction EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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costs, which were involved with multiple currencies, are likely to increase the role of the 
Euro, also when compared to the sum of the individual European currencies. 
 
In spite of the inertia in international finance, the Euro could become relatively quickly 
the preferred currency for the candidate accession countries, replacing to some extent 
the Deutsch Mark (Eichengreen, 1996). 
 
 
6.2.3  The economic significance of having an international currency 
 
Apart from issues of status and power, there are valid economic advantages for wanting to 
see one￿s own currency as the international currency and having other countries peg their 
currency to it. These advantages are related to markets and institutions of the issuing country 
and to its international trade. It virtually eliminates exchange rate risk for domestic 
companies and takes away their need to enter into costly hedging schemes. 
 
The most explicit advantage for the issuer of the international currency is the ability to 
finance balance of payments deficits with liabilities denominated in the domestic currency. 
Because of its role as medium of exchange, other countries will absorb liabilities and hoard 
reserves in the international currency. This implies that the so-called international seigniorage 
benefits accrue to the issuing authority. In this context, three effects can be distinguished. 
 
•  The ability to obtain real resources (net imports) in exchange for almost costless 
banknotes. As long as the issuing authority does not put international currency on the 
international markets beyond what is demanded, the international currency does not 
depreciate and the country can use currency issue to finance imports. 
 
•  The international seigniorage component, i.e. the liquidity discount on assets 
denominated in the international currency. The large demand for these assets by non-
residents, who use it as a means for making international payments and for holding 
international reserves, reduces the real yield the issuer has to pay on its debt; and 
 
•  Finally, the country that issues the international currency has the option of eliminating 
some of its (foreign) debt with surprise inflation. 
 
Given the dominant position of the US dollar in world monetary affairs and its role of 
international currency, the international seigniorage accruing to the US is estimated to be in 
the order of magnitude of 0.2% of GDP (Portes and Rey, 1998).  
 
If the Euro is successful in taking over the place of the US dollar as the dominant 




6.3  The impact of enlargement on the international role of the Euro 
The role of the Euro in the international monetary system will be affected by the enlargement 
of the EU and EMU. The obvious reason for this is that when new countries join EMU and 
adopt the Euro, the economic base of the Euro becomes larger. Integration of the commodity 
and financial markets of the new entrants with the existing Euro area creates an even larger EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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momentum for the Euro by increasing its share in world trade and deepening its financial 
markets. The associated increase in commodity and asset trade denominated in Euro lowers 
transaction costs, increases invoicing in Euro and advances the case for using the Euro as 
reserve currency by outside countries. 
 
However, even combined, the entrant CEECs￿ share in world output and exports is small. 
Their financial markets are hardly developed and the few assets in these countries are already 
largely denominated in D-Mark or Euro￿s. Hence, the contribution of these countries to 
the enlargement of the Euro￿s economic and financial base is quite limited and will thus 
hardly affect the Euro￿s role in the international money markets. In fact, the role of the 
Euro in the international monetary system would benefit much more from entry of the UK. 
 
On the other side of the entry-balance is a considerable threat. The CEE accession countries 
have not been able to build up a long track record of sound macroeconomic policy. This 
should not pose much concern, if the current strict economic requirements for accession in 
force, and the three-phased process on a path to convergence with the EU, as described in the 
￿Composite Paper￿ (see EC, 1998), is respected. These requirements could guarantee a 
smooth integration of these countries into the EMU. 
 
Nevertheless, especially after the latest conflict with Serbia, a good deal of political pressure 
is building up to speed up accession. Although the political reasons are understandable by 
themselves, the current strict economic requirements for accession in force may be relaxed 
significantly because of it. This entails a serious danger that the EU and EMU are enlarged 
with countries that have not (yet) achieved a sufficient degree of economic and institutional 
stability and this could imply a weakening of EMU￿s macroeconomic and monetary 
fundamentals that underlies the prospective role of the Euro. 
 
Another important threat of enlargement, that may be detrimental to the future role of the 
Euro, is that entry of the accession countries into EMU will mean that countries in very 
different stages of development will be accommodated. Without the exchange rate or 
monetary policy as cushion, and with major limitations to fiscal transfers and low intra-
community labour mobility, the differences in development between the candidate countries 
and the E(M)U core may exert a large toll resulting in high unemployment, high interest rates 
and/or high inflation. In addition, if large transfers must be made from the E(M)U core to the 
candidate countries, this will weaken the core￿s fiscal balance as well (see the discussion in 
chapter 5). As a result, the EMU and the Euro could lose, in a worst case scenario, much of 
its international appeal and credibility and thus its prospective role as an international 
currency may be harmed. 
 
Conclusion 
The economic effect of entry of the CEE candidate countries into EMU has two sides. 
On the one hand a positive, but limited, impact of a larger economic base. On the other 
hand, a potential threat of premature entry, i.e. before the potential entrants comply 
with EMU norms. This can severely damage the Euro￿s credibility and the 
macroeconomic stability of the Euro area. 
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6.4  Implications of the EMU and its further enlargement for selected 
groups of non-participants
84 
The establishment of the EMU will not only have an impact on the participating countries but 
also, directly or indirectly, on non-participating countries. Especially countries with close 
links to the Euro area will be affected. Most important are links with respect to external trade, 
exchange rate links with currencies that will disappear and links to the European capital 
markets for borrowing in EU currencies.  
 
As analysed in Ruhashyankiko (1998, 1999), an important short-term effect of the 
elimination of intra-Euro area exchange rate risk is the diversion of economic activity, 
including investment and trade, towards the Euro area. This is potentially harmful for the 
countries that remain outside the Euro as they see their exports to the Euro area and 
investment from the Euro area decline. Counterbalancing the diversion effect, is a more 
dynamic investment and trade creation effect that arises from an economically more 
efficiently operating Euro area. This will tend to boost economic growth. Non-participants 
could benefit from increased economic activity, as this will, by itself, increase their 
opportunities for trade with the Euro area. More direct foreign investment from this area will 
also be possible in the longer term. 
 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, accession to the E(M)U by the accession 
countries will have profound effects on these countries themselves. On non-participants, 
enlargement of EMU will mainly further intensify the effects of establishment of the 
EMU in the first place.  
 
The threats of enlargement identified in chapter 6.3 may, however, also affect the outsiders. 
A weakening of macroeconomic performance could harm the economic development and the 
trade performance of the Euro area. It may also induce even larger exchange rate volatility 
between the major international currencies. 
 
This paragraph will deal with the possible developments stemming from the introduction of 
the EMU and its anticipated enlargements for the following three country groups of non-
participants. 
•  The non-accession countries of Central and East Europe (CEEC), including Russia and 
the Ukraine 
•  The CFA franc zone 
•  The Mediterranean countries 
 
For most of the countries in these three regions the EU is the principal partner in trade, 
development support and economic co-operation. None of these countries has an exchange 
rate arrangement with the Euro zone or the EU as a whole, but a number of them do have 
such an arrangement with one or more individual EU countries. 
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6.4.1  The non-accession Central and East European Countries (CEEC), Russia and 
the Ukraine 
 
It is generally expected that, after joining the E(M)U, the 10 CEE accession countries will 
move their orientation, with regard to trade, investment and co-operation further in the 
direction of the EU. This diversion trend in economic activity already started almost a decade 
ago, after the collapse of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trade regime 
in 1991. This could be a potential threat and lead to a feeling of isolation for the non-
participating CEE countries such as Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and for Russia and the 
Ukraine. 
 
On the other hand, an enlarged EU, which will border on these non-participating countries, 
will become even more important as trading partner, donor, and foreign direct investor for 
these non-participating countries. Positive medium and long-term trade creation effects, 
generated by more prosperous neighbours, are also likely to occur. 
 
It is widely recognised, however, that future economic development of these countries not 
only depends on their co-operation with the enlarged EU, but much more upon their own 
capability to transform their economies and to integrate into the world economy. 
 
 
6.4.2  The CFA franc zone 
 
Background 
The CFA franc zone consists of two separate monetary unions, each with its own common 
currency and central bank, and apart from this, one separate country, the Islamic Federal 
Republic of the Comoros.
85 There are no significant political or economic relations between 
these two unions. Their two central banks have identical agreements with the French 
authorities based upon the following provisions (see CarrØ 1997): 
•  fixed exchange rate against the French franc; 
•  full convertibility of their currencies into French franc, guaranteed by the French 
Treasury; 
•  pooling of foreign assets of the CFA franc member countries, which are required to 
maintain a large portion of their net foreign reserves in French franc in an Operations 
Account at the French Treasury; and  
•  participation of the French authorities in the definition of monetary policy in the CFA 
franc zone (as a counterpart to the guaranteed convertibility). 
 
After the start of EMU, the budgetary agreement between France and the countries of the 
CFA franc zone, which is related to the exchange rate link, has been continued. In this way, 
the countries in the CFA franc zones are receiving a budgetary guarantee for maintaining the 
value of their currency. 
 
                                                 
85   The first monetary union is the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), including Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, C￿te d￿ Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The other is the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) including Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Eq. Guinea and Gabon. EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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Currency mismatch 
Most CFA franc countries are currently mainly exporting primary commodities, which are 
traded on the international markets in US dollars (Bakker and Kapteyn, 1997). Most of their 
imports are denominated in European currencies (and in the future probably in Euro). This 
mismatch is leading to large exchange rate risk for these countries. This risk will be 
aggravated if the creation of the EMU increases the exchange rate volatility between the 
world￿s most important currencies (see paragraph 6.3). 
 
To reduce this mismatch, it would be beneficial if future denominations of some of the 
primary export commodities were changed to Euro. This seems especially logical for those 
commodities that are dominantly consumed in Europe and mainly produced in Africa, such as 
cacao. 
 
Another mismatch occurs for highly indebted CFA franc countries that have strong trade 
links to Europe, while they are paying their contractual financial obligations on their debt 
mainly in US dollars. These countries are restricted in their ability to diversify their liabilities 
because of limited access to international capital markets (see IMF, 1997b). 
 
Only those countries with access to private capital will be able to profit from the lowering of 
interest rates and the deepening of financial markets with Euro-denominated bonds. Such 
countries have the possibility of diversifying their portfolio and reducing a possible mismatch 
between export revenues and their financial obligations. 
 
Anchoring to the Euro 
The EMU may provide a monetary anchor for African countries in general to bring down 
inflation and build up credibility. These countries may invest in macro-economic stability by 
anchoring their monetary policy to the Euro. Producers in such countries will then be able to 
reduce their transaction costs for transactions with the Euro area, because their exchange rate 
risk is eliminated.  
 
In 1996, the European Commission issued a green paper on the future relationship between 
EU and ACP countries (Commission of the European Communities, 1996). This paper put 
forward some basic principles for improving European assistance, notably by deeper 
monetary and macro-economic co-operation between the EU and the ACP countries. It 
considers the EMU as a new opportunity for ACP countries, especially those countries with 
strong trade relations with the EU, to anchor their currencies to the Euro. Such a linkage 
between periphery countries would lead to a more reliable monetary policy in these countries, 
would stimulate intra-regional trade and ease regional integration. 
 
From an OCA perspective (see chapter 5), however, some doubts can be cast on the use of 
such anchoring to the Euro for ACP countries (see Monga, 1997). It takes away an adjustment 
instrument to deal with asymmetric shocks in a region that is very different from the EU. 
 
A significant impact from the enlargement of the EMU to the 10 CEECs and Cyprus 
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6.4.3.  The Mediterranean countries 
 
The Mediterranean countries (MED) in the Middle East and North Africa
86 are, except for 
Cyprus and Malta, not candidates to join the E(M)U. Their geographical pattern of trade, 
however, is heavily concentrated on the EU. Most of them are exporting more than half of 
their non-oil exports to the EU, while for some (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) this 
percentage is even above 80%. Therefore, the Euro is expected to be a very important 
currency for their trade. 
 
The MED countries are mainly competitors of Greece and the EMU members Italy, Spain 
and Portugal. Due to the participation of the latter three countries in EMU they are gaining 
from lower transaction costs and higher efficiency. Greece would do the same after its 
participation. Consequently, some diversion of economic activity and trade from the MED 
countries to these EMU members in Southern Europe might occur. 
 
The increased international exchange rate volatility could be another negative impact of the 
EMU for these Southern Mediterranean countries. In the longer run, however, more dynamic 
impacts, positive spill-overs, trade creation and lowering of international interest rates can be 
expected from the EMU and its enlargement. Furthermore, the Euro could become attractive 
as a reserve currency and as an anchor for the exchange rate policy in this region. 
 
Also for the MED region, a significant impact from the enlargement of the EMU is not 
anticipated. 
                                                 
86  The MED region in EU terms include Morocco, Tunesia, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
Palestinian Administrated Areas, Turkey and Malta and Cyprus. Once again, it must be noted that, after the 
13 October recommendations, Turkey (wich has applied for EU membership) may eventually have the 
status of an accession country. Malta and Cyprus are, of course, already "Application Countries". EMU AND ENLARGEMENT 
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